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 Science presents many challenging topics, and incorrect prior knowledge of them 
often interferes with learning. Research has demonstrated that refutation texts promote 
conceptual change learning by helping readers abandon scientific misconceptions. Little 
is known about the factors that influence knowledge enrichment, the learning that ensues 
when students have incomplete knowledge of a topic. The purpose of this study was to 
compare the impact of these two types of prior knowledge on science text 
comprehension. 
 Participants were 28 high school students (14 to 15 years) who completed 
assessments of vocabulary, reading comprehension, epistemological beliefs, self-efficacy, 
interest, and prior knowledge of 4 science topics (2 misconception, 2 incomplete prior 
knowledge) on Day 1. On Day 2, participants read 4 science texts (2 refutation, 2 
expository) and completed tests of comprehension.  
Results demonstrated that epistemological beliefs moderated the increase between 
pre- and posttest scores regardless of the type of prior knowledge. Knowledge enrichment 
was more than 2 times as likely as conceptual change, which required a minimum level of 
epistemological understandings. Although refutation texts rarely led to conceptual 
change, they contributed to knowledge enrichment more often than traditional expository 
texts did. Future studies should investigate the impact of non-textual factors on 
conceptual change and knowledge enrichment in science.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 
 Despite efforts to improve students’ reading comprehension performance, scores 
on national reading assessments have remained relatively stable for almost two decades 
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2011a). Such assessments consist of passages 
on a variety of topics from different content areas. Reading comprehension, particularly 
at deep levels, depends not only on general language comprehension skills, but also on 
knowledge of the passage topic (e.g., Hirsch, 2006; Jetton & Alexander, 2004; Moje, 
2008a; Moje & Speyer, 2008).  
The role of prior knowledge in text comprehension is perhaps best acknowledged 
by researchers in adolescent literacy, a time during which students read extensively in 
different disciplines. In addition to specialized bodies of knowledge, lexicons, and 
problems (Jetton & Alexander, 2004), disciplines have different conventions for how 
knowledge is produced and communicated (Moje, 2008a). The goal of disciplinary 
literacy is for students to learn these established discipline-specific discourses and text 
structures (Moje, 2008a). For example, historians pay close attention to sources and read 
texts as interpretations of the past, whereas mathematicians read proofs to detect errors 
because they are taken as the truth. On the other hand, because knowledge in science is 
generated through experimentation, scientists read texts with the goal of understanding 
the methodology in order to make sense of the findings (Shanahan & Shanahan, 2008). 
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The current research is concerned with science, the discipline investigated in most 
previous studies of prior knowledge and text comprehension. 
Though science is often conceptualized as a hands-on discipline, text 
comprehension is equally important. Experts in science spend an overwhelming majority 
of their time reading and writing in order to acquire and generate new knowledge 
(Pearson, Moje, & Greenleaf, 2010; Shanahan, 2004). How well students comprehend 
science texts may determine the extent to which a scientifically literate citizenry (Pearson 
et al., 2010) is able to critically comprehend future scientific findings. Although having 
prior knowledge of the topic impacts text comprehension, its exact role is unclear because 
prior knowledge is not all or nothing. Chi (2008) described three conditions other than 
correct prior knowledge in science. Students can have (a) no prior knowledge of, (b) 
incomplete knowledge of, or (c) misconceptions about to-be-learned concepts. In the first 
two cases, information is learned by adding new knowledge or filling in gaps of missing 
knowledge, respectively. In both cases, learning has been described as knowledge 
enrichment (Carey, 1991). In the third condition, prior misconceived knowledge must be 
altered to the scientific conception in order for learning to occur. This type of knowledge 
acquisition is known as conceptual change. A primary goal of science education is to 
promote conceptual change because students frequently possess misconceptions (Dole, 
2000). The importance of addressing student misconceptions in science is reflected by a 
long line of research that investigates how to best help students abandon them (e.g., 
Guzzetti, 2000; Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 
1982).  
3 
 
 
 
 Misconceptions in science are resistant to change (Dole, 2000). These naïve 
conceptions are often based on robust and logical explanations made from everyday 
experiences (Gardner, 1991). Furthermore, science textbooks typically do not consider 
the level of students’ background knowledge or adequately explain concepts (cf. 
Broughton & Sinatra, 2010; Goldman & Bisanz, 2002; Smolkin, McTigue, & Donovan, 
2008). The nature of science texts impacts the influence of prior knowledge on 
comprehension. In an early study, Alvermann, Smith, and Readence (1985) demonstrated 
that when prior knowledge was consistent with a science text, it did not facilitate 
comprehension. On the other hand, when a science text presented counterintuitive 
information, student misconceptions interfered with comprehension and prevented 
conceptual change. Given this relationship, one may ask whether conceptual change is 
likely to occur at all from reading science texts.  
 Twenty years of research has revealed that a specific kind of text structure is 
powerful in inducing conceptual change in science (e.g., Dole, 2000; Guzzetti, 2000). 
Refutation texts make explicit references to commonly held misconceptions and directly 
refute them with scientifically acceptable ideas. In a recent review, Tippett (2010) 
concluded that most studies that compared refutation and traditional expository texts 
reported enhanced conceptual change with refutation texts. Although the research in this 
area is quite clear about the power of refutation texts in helping students abandon 
misconceptions, its clinical application is limited. Not only are there few published 
refutation texts (Tippett, personal communication), but student dispositions were often 
not taken into consideration. 
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The importance of student dispositions has been emphasized in recent models of 
conceptual change (Sinatra, 2005). For example, students with higher topic interest and 
advanced epistemological beliefs about science benefit more from refutation texts than 
students with lower levels (Mason, Gava, & Boldrin, 2008). A student with advanced 
epistemological beliefs about science understands the tentative nature of knowledge in 
the discipline and that scientists are not authoritative sources (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). 
These understandings can be incorporated into disciplinary literacy instructional 
programs (Moje, 2008a). 
 How comprehension builds new knowledge has largely been ignored by both 
researchers and educators (Cervetti, Jaynes, & Hiebert, 2009).Whereas conceptual 
change learning has received much attention, investigations on knowledge enrichment 
(Carey, 1991), the learning that ensues when students have no or incomplete prior 
knowledge, have not been conducted. It may be that science text comprehension is 
impacted differently by the two types of prior knowledge. The role of student dispositions 
(e.g., advanced epistemological beliefs) in conceptual change learning may not be as 
important when misconceptions are not held.  
The main goal of this research is to uncover factors that contribute to science text 
comprehension. One purpose is to investigate how different types of prior knowledge 
affect the ability to learn new information from science texts. Two conditions of prior 
knowledge are investigated: when students (a) hold common misconceptions and (b) 
have incomplete knowledge. A second purpose is to determine whether student 
dispositions play equally important roles in the two conditions of prior knowledge. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
 An important research agenda within adolescent literacy explores reading 
comprehension in subject areas such as science, history, and math. This area of research 
has been referred to as domain-specific reading (Jetton & Alexander, 2004), disciplinary 
comprehension (Shanahan, 2009), and disciplinary literacy (Moje, 2008a, 2008b; 
Shanahan & Shanahan, 2008). These terms are similar in their acknowledgment of the 
importance of knowledge in comprehending texts in different subject areas, but the kinds 
of knowledge they propose differ in significant ways.  
 The term first used in the literature, domain-specific reading (Jetton & Alexander, 
2004), acknowledges the importance of two types of content knowledge: domain 
knowledge (i.e., the breadth of knowledge in a field, such as biology) and topic 
knowledge (i.e., background knowledge relative to the subject of a text). Disciplinary 
comprehension (Shanahan, 2009), a more recent term used to describe the comprehension 
of texts within a particular discipline, stresses the role of disciplinary (versus content) 
knowledge. This knowledge entails discipline-specific understandings of how 
information is created, communicated, and evaluated. Disciplinary knowledge includes 
knowledge of the range of topics in a discipline, but not necessarily knowledge of 
specific topics themselves. Experts in the field of science, for example, use their 
disciplinary knowledge to comprehend texts for which they know little or nothing about. 
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When reading about these unfamiliar topics, they transition from reading in the typical 
critical mode to reading in a learning mode. Finally, disciplinary literacy (Moje, 2008a) is 
a combination of the previous two terms. It conceptualizes learning in the subject areas as 
learning both the knowledge and modes of knowledge production and communication in 
the disciplines. Disciplinary literacy also recognizes that the epistemological perspectives 
of the members in a discipline affect how they think and thus produce and consume texts 
(Moje, 2008b).  
 The term disciplinary literacy was chosen for this study because it encompasses 
multiple forms of knowledge that affect learning in subject areas. It is also useful 
pedagogically, as it encourages secondary subject area teachers to build disciplinary 
literacy instructional programs that focus on subject area knowledge and discipline-
specific practices (Moje, 2008a; Shanahan & Shanahan, 2008). The current research 
investigates disciplinary literacy within the subject area of science. 
Disciplinary Literacy and Science 
 Understanding what is required of students as they read science texts requires 
knowledge of how the discipline of science operates. Hynd (2002) outlines two main 
scientific principles. First, science rests on the assumptions of the scientific method. In 
science, knowledge is created through controlled experimentation, and numerical 
assessments of data determine outcomes. Scientists remain objective when interpreting 
evidence, while at the same time acknowledging their own and others’ biases. They can 
be influenced and constrained by their research interests, measurement devices, and 
understandings of previous findings.  
7 
 
 
 
The second principle is that scientific understandings are in a constant state of 
flux (Hynd, 2002). Armed with this knowledge, scientists critically read and evaluate 
scientific texts. The topics that are studied and which findings gain acceptance are 
determined in part by the replication of findings. Knowledge of the peer-review and 
publication process also makes scientists able to assign credibility to some findings (i.e., 
those published in well-respected journals) and not others (i.e., those published in 
nonrefereed publications). Students and the lay public without this disciplinary 
knowledge cannot make such evaluations.  
According to Goldman and Bisanz (2002), scientists’ level of prior topic 
knowledge as well as their disciplinary knowledge affects the manner with which they 
read research reports. When reading within their field, rather than reading a text linearly, 
scientists first read the findings in order to add to their current knowledge base. On the 
other hand, when scientists read outside their areas of expertise, they read texts 
sequentially and more for general interest than for knowledge acquisition. When 
scientists review an article for publication, they pay more attention to methodological 
concerns than when they read published reports. Scientists resolve comprehension 
difficulties based on a cost-benefit analysis in which source, approach, and sensibility of 
the findings are evaluated. Again, students without such privileged disciplinary 
knowledge do not approach scientific texts in this manner. 
If disciplinary literacy in science requires expert knowledge and experience, then 
what is expected of adolescents reading science texts? What is meant by scientific 
literacy? Familiarity with science concepts and ways of thinking are only part of the 
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issue. A more comprehensive understanding of scientific literacy “makes explicit 
connections among the language of science, how science concepts are rendered in various 
text forms, and resulting science knowledge” (Pearson et al., 2010, p. 459). Students are 
expected to gain proficiency in reading, writing, and reasoning with the language, texts, 
and dispositions of science. These abilities are essential to full participation in public 
discourse about science. The current state of adolescent scientific literacy, as revealed by 
standardized assessment data, is not promising. 
The 2009 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) science 
assessment, administered to students in the fourth, eighth, and twelfth grades, tested 
science content (i.e., physical science, life science, and earth/space sciences) and how 
students use scientific knowledge to solve novel problems (NCES, 2011b). Not only did 
the percentage of students who performed at the Proficient level (defined as “solid 
academic performance” [NCES, 2011b, p. 1]) decrease with age (from 34% to 21%), but 
the percentage of students who performed below the Basic level (defined as “partial 
mastery of the knowledge and skills” [NCES, 2011b, p. 1]) increased from 28% in fourth 
grade to 40% in the senior year of high school, leaving no time for these students to 
acquire and refine scientific literacy skills before their post-secondary academic and 
career pursuits. Results of the 2011 administration, given only to eighth graders, revealed 
a small but significant increase in the percentage of students performing at or above the 
basic level (from 63% in 2009 to 65% in 2011). Over a third of eighth grade students, 
though, continued to perform below the Basic level (NCES, 2012).   
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The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a triennial 
assessment of 15-year-old students’ performance in scientific literacy, conceptualized as 
how well students apply scientific knowledge and skills to daily situations (Fleischman, 
Hopstock, Pelczar, & Shelley, 2010). Although students in the United States 
demonstrated average performance on the 2009 administration, average scores from 18 of 
the other 63 participating countries, including Shanghai, Finland, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, were 
significantly higher. Only 29% of students in the United States scored at or above level 4, 
the level at which students are able to link explanations from different areas of science to 
life situations. Furthermore, 18% of U.S. students performed below level 2, the baseline 
level of proficiency for competencies that enable full participation in life situations 
related to science.  
Inquiry-based literacy practices provide hope for science education and 
underscore the connection between literacy and science knowledge espoused by the 
comprehensive view of scientific literacy (Cervetti, Pearson, Bravo, & Barber, 2006; 
Pearson et al., 2010). Language and literacy are a means to helping students gain the 
knowledge, skills, and dispositions of science. These secondhand scientific investigations 
(a) reinforce what is learned from firsthand (hands-on) investigations, (b) help students 
learn about topics that are not conducive to firsthand investigations (e.g., ocean, outer 
space), and (c) allow students to apply inquiry-based skills from firsthand investigations 
to other domains (Cervetti et al., 2006). These literacy practices are not passive. Rather, 
students actively make meaning of science and learn how scientists think. Several 
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programs that use texts to support scientific inquiry provide promising data on their effect 
on science learning (cf. Cervetti et al., 2006; Fang & Wei, 2010; Pearson et al., 2010). 
The relationship between literacy and science is not unidirectional. Not only does 
literacy support science learning, but science provides an ideal context for practicing 
literacy skills. Science and reading comprehension share many reasoning processes: 
setting purposes, making sense of data, inferring word meanings, asking questions, 
clarifying information, drawing inferences, and making evidence-based arguments 
(Pearson et al., 2010). When students read in science, literacy skills are used for gaining 
both content and disciplinary knowledge. Students are not only required to master a 
knowledge base that represents the current understandings of the scientific community, 
but also be able to solve problems, make predictions, and apply their understandings to 
new contexts. Students reading science texts must also suspend commonly held beliefs in 
favor of scientific evidence (Hynd, 2002).  
 Despite the complementary relationship between science and literacy, there are 
several challenges facing students acquiring scientific literacy. Time constraints in the 
classroom, as well as pressures stemming from state testing result in breadth versus depth 
of coverage, despite the advantages of deep coverage. For example, grades in 
introductory university science classes were higher for students who reported deep 
coverage of at least one topic in a respective high school science course than for those 
who reported no deep coverage (Schwartz, Sadler, Sonnert, & Tai, 2009). Furthermore, 
“leaving a topic too soon deprives students and teachers the time to experience situations 
that allow students to confront personal understandings and connections and to evaluate 
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the usefulness of scientific models within their personal models” (Schwartz et al., 2009, 
p. 820). This problem is confounded by the use of science texts that provide cursory 
coverage of numerous topics (cf. Broughton & Sinatra, 2010; Goldman & Bisanz, 2002; 
Smolkin et al., 2008). Factors related to prior knowledge and student dispositions and 
attitudes related to science can either present challenges to or facilitate learning in 
science. Aspects that are the focus of the current research are discussed in the next 
section. 
Factors Affecting Science Learning 
Learning in any content area requires a unique set of understandings. Proficiency 
is influenced by, among other things, students’ levels of prior knowledge, understandings 
of the discipline, interest in the subject matter, attitudes and dispositions, and learning 
goals (Hynd, 2002). When learning is construed as text comprehension, it is obviously 
also influenced by reading skill, regardless of the discipline. O’Reilly and McNamara 
(1997) demonstrated that reading skill had more of an effect than general science 
knowledge on high school students’ science passage comprehension test scores. In fact, 
for open-ended passage comprehension, reading skill partially compensated for low 
general science knowledge. Whereas O’Reilly and McNamara (1997) found a positive 
relationship between science knowledge and science passage comprehension, the 
majority of research has focused on how to overcome the deleterious effect of inaccurate 
prior knowledge (e.g., Alvermann & Hague, 1989; Hynd, McWhorter, Phares, & Suttles, 
1994; Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007). 
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Prior Knowledge Misconceptions 
Defined simply as the whole of a person’s knowledge, prior knowledge is 
dynamic, structured, and both explicit and tacit in nature. It is available for learning tasks 
and exists as declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge (Dochy, 1996; Dochy & 
Alexander, 1995). Use of the term prior knowledge in the literature typically makes the 
assumption that it is correct. Furthermore, it assumes a dichotomy; students either possess 
the relevant knowledge, which facilitates learning, or they do not (Dole, 2000).  
Learning, however, can take place under other conditions of prior knowledge 
(Chi, 2008). First, as in the dichotomous view of prior knowledge, students can have no 
prior knowledge of to-be-learned concepts. When prior knowledge is missing, learning is 
characterized by adding new information. Second, students’ prior knowledge can be 
partially correct. When prior knowledge is incomplete, learning is conceived as gap-
filling. Learning in both cases has been described as knowledge enrichment (Carey, 
1991). Research has not examined how these two types of prior knowledge impact 
science text comprehension. Finally, students can hold common misconceptions about 
scientific principles. In this case, learning requires changing prior misconceived 
knowledge to correct knowledge, resulting in conceptual change. There is a long line of 
research concerning misconceptions in science (cf. Tippett, 2010 for a review).  
Misconceptions have been described as “fundamental and inevitable aspects of 
human learning” (Alexander, 1998, p. 56) and can be characterized as (a) preconceived 
notions (i.e., popular misconceptions rooted in everyday experiences), (b) nonscientific 
beliefs (i.e., gained from religion or myth rather than science education), (c) conceptual 
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misunderstandings (i.e., result of not being taught in a way that confronts preconceived 
notions or nonscientific beliefs), (d) vernacular misconceptions (i.e., result of words 
having a more common meaning and another scientific meaning), and/or (e) factual 
misconceptions (i.e., falsities learned early and retained into adulthood) (Committee on 
Undergraduate Science Education, 1997). Misconceptions become stronger over time 
(Alexander, 1998). Learners new to a discipline often possess knowledge that is 
fragmented and not cohesively linked to central concepts. Their misconceptions are likely 
deeply held because they stem from everyday experience and are tacit. Although students 
can memorize new information, they often fail to see how it conflicts with their current 
understandings. Once students gain a foundation of the fundamental principles of a 
discipline, these misconceptions have strengthened because their conceptual networks 
grew around malformed notions. 
Misconceptions pose a challenge to learning and scientific literacy. For example, 
sixth grade students’ misconceptions interfered with their comprehension of a text that 
presented counterintuitive information on sunlight (Alvermann, Smith, & Readence, 
1985). Most students maintained their misconceptions in written passage recalls, 
indicating that the text had little influence on changing their understandings. This effect 
has also been demonstrated in undergraduate students, who relied on misconceptions to 
make knowledge-based inferences during reading (Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007). 
Surprisingly, readers did not detect the contradictions between their explanations and text 
information. Abandoning misconceptions requires acknowledgment of a conflict between 
the misconception and the scientifically valid explanation, as well as the replacement of 
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“one seemingly viable, simple, and personally constructed belief with another that is 
more difficult to substantiate, more complex, and removed from personal experience” 
(Alexander, 1998, p. 61).  
According to Gardner (1991), when students are confronted with a problem in 
science, they often revert back to primitive theories. For example, a common 
misconception in science is that seasonal change is due to the distance of the earth from 
the sun. The primitive that undergirds this misconception is that perceived warmth is 
determined by distance from a heat source. Students may demonstrate an understanding 
of the scientific conception of seasonal change (i.e., the tilt of the earth’s axis) when 
directly questioned, but the majority revert to a primitive explanation when quizzed on 
the concept later if instruction was not successful at invalidating it with the scientific 
conception.  
This invalidation and abandonment of misconceptions is the hallmark of 
conceptual change learning. The theory of conceptual change first proposed (Posner et 
al., 1982) suggested that certain conditions must be met for conceptual change learning in 
science. A student must be dissatisfied with the existing conception. Then they must be 
confronted with a new conception that is intelligible, plausible, and generalizes to other 
phenomena. These conditions explain why ordinary forms of instruction (e.g., lecture, 
traditional text, labs) are often ineffectual in inducing conceptual change and suggest 
alternative methodologies (Guzzetti, 2000). 
Two decades of research has revealed that refutation texts are the most effective 
text-based means for inducing conceptual change in science (Tippett, 2010). Refutation 
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texts challenge readers’ misconceptions with explicit refutations to common 
misconceptions and emphasize currently accepted scientific conceptions (Guzzetti, 2000). 
In the following example of a refutation text, the first two sentences present the 
misconception and the last two are the refutation and currently accepted scientific 
explanation. In this selection, an optional refutation cue separates the core components. 
 
Some people believe that a camel stores water in its hump. They think that the 
hump gets smaller as the camel uses up water. But this idea is not true. The hump 
stores fat and grows smaller only if the camel has not eaten for a long time. A 
camel can also live for days without water because the water is produced as the 
fat in its hump is used up. (Tippett, 2010, p. 953) 
 
 
It has been suggested that this format of refutation texts leads to conceptual change 
because it creates cognitive conflict between simultaneously activated misconceptions 
and scientific conceptions (Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007). 
In her review of 22 empirical studies from refereed journals and conference 
presentations, Tippett (2010) reported that refutation text was more likely to result in 
conceptual change than traditional expository text. She also suggested differences among 
grade levels, with refutation text being more likely to result in conceptual change in 
grades 3 through 10 (versus K-2 and 11-undergraduate). This conclusion is questionable 
for several reasons. First, only one relevant K-2 study was located. Second, six of the 
eleven experiments conducted with the oldest students found that refutation text was 
indeed more effective. Furthermore, her conclusion that refutation texts used in two 
experiments from one study (Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007) were not more effective 
than expository text appears misguided because undergraduates with misconceptions 
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recalled statistically more text propositions after reading the refutation text. Tippett 
(2010) concluded that because refutation text was never found to be less effective than 
traditional expository text, refutation text effectively promotes conceptual change when 
readers of any age possess misconceptions. The remainder of this section presents 
findings from studies that compared refutation and traditional expository texts, first for 
undergraduate students and then for school-aged students. 
Some of the earliest studies that investigated science learning in the presence of 
misconceptions were conducted with low performing college students (i.e., students who 
had low high school grade point averages and/or low SAT scores; Alvermann & Hague, 
1989; Hynd & Alvermann, 1986). All of the undergraduates in both studies possessed 
misconceptions regarding Newton’s principle of motion, as revealed by performance on 
true/false prior knowledge tests. Students in each group completed a series of posttests 
either immediately after (Alvermann & Hague, 1989; short-answer, true/false, and an 
application problem) or two days after (Hynd & Alvermann, 1986; written free recall and 
true/false) they read either refutation or expository texts. Results of both studies revealed 
that students who read the refutation text significantly outperformed those who read the 
nonrefutation text, with pretest performance as the covariate. The advantage of the 
refutation text was most apparent on short-answer tests and written recalls.  
Investigations that assessed typically developing undergraduate student 
performance confirm these early findings. In one experiment, undergraduates with no 
previous college physics experience read either a traditional expository text or what the 
authors referred to as a conceptual change text on electricity (Wang & Andre, 1991). Half 
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of the participants in each text condition completed a test of their prior knowledge. 
Students who read the conceptual change text outperformed those who read the 
traditional expository text, although this advantage was limited to those whose prior 
knowledge was not assessed. It seems that the prior knowledge test itself alerted 
participants of their misconceptions, reducing the effect of the conceptual change text on 
conceptual understanding. 
A more recent study of elementary education majors learning astronomy concepts 
(i.e., seasonal change and moon phases) revealed that, as expected, the refutation text 
resulted in significantly more conceptual change than the expository text (Frède, 2008). 
In fact, there were no significant differences between performance on the pretest and 
immediate and delayed (1-month) posttests in the expository group, indicating that those 
participants did not increase their knowledge at all. The highest score increases actually 
occurred for participants who engaged in small group refutation modeling activities, 
leading the author to conclude that collaborative approaches to conceptual change 
learning are superior to approaches involving individual involvement with a refutation 
text.  
Few research efforts have aimed at uncovering the cognitive processes involved 
in the refutation text effect. Using an online think-aloud methodology, Kendeou and van 
den Broek (2007, Experiment 1) demonstrated that undergraduates with misconceptions 
about Newtonian mechanics generated fewer correct inferences and more incorrect 
inferences than those without misconceptions. Undergraduates with misconceptions 
engaged in more conceptual change strategies (i.e., experienced cognitive conflict, 
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responded to conflict, contrasted information) while reading the refutation text. The 
authors speculated that the more conceptual change strategies readers used, the more 
correct inferences they made, which in turn led to better memory on written recalls. 
Significant bivariate correlations between conceptual change strategies and inferences 
and between inferences and recall, but not between conceptual change processes and 
recall, lent support to the hypothesis that inference-making ability mediated the effect of 
conceptual change on written recall. 
A more recent study confirmed that refutation texts increased the number of 
inferences undergraduates generated in text recalls (Diakidoy, Mouskounti, & Ioannides, 
2011). Participants who read the refutation text generated more global bridging and 
elaborative inferences, but there was no difference in the number of local bridging 
inferences or the quantity of text information recalled as compared to the traditional 
expository text. The benefit of the refutation text was more pronounced for participants 
with inaccurate prior knowledge.  
Broughton, Sinatra, and Reynolds (2010) reported that undergraduates who read a 
refutation text and those that read a traditional expository text about seasonal change 
actually showed similar improvements between prior knowledge and comprehension 
scores. A standardized measure of reading rate and reading comprehension explained a 
significant amount of the variance in this improvement. Despite the similarity in scores, 
participants who read the refutation text demonstrated a greater decrease in the number of 
misconceptions present from pre- to posttest. These participants often reported that the 
refutation segments were the most important part of the passage. Interestingly, these text 
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segments were read significantly faster than the corresponding text segments in the 
traditional text. The authors concluded that the refutation text information may be easier 
to process, which contributes to greater conceptual change. 
Studies involving school-aged children also report positive effects of refutation 
text on conceptual change as compared to expository text (but see Guzzetti, 1990). An 
early study of children in fifth and sixth grades used short texts based on individual 
participants’ misconceptions in science and social studies topics (Maria & MacGinitie, 
1987). Students read texts in four conditions: a refutation text on a topic for which they 
held a misconception, a refutation text for which no misconception was held, a refutation 
text with alternate ordering (i.e., the correct information was presented before the 
misconception), and a nonrefutation text. Posttest performance revealed that oral recalls 
of nonrefutation texts were significantly less likely to contain new information. There 
were no significant differences between the other three conditions, indicating that 
refutation texts are of equal benefit regardless of whether or not a misconception is held. 
A more recent study uncovered differences based on the type of comprehension 
assessed and level of prior knowledge (Mikkilä-Erdmann, 2001). Fifth grade students 
read either a conceptual change text or a traditional expository text on photosynthesis and 
answered 11 essay questions (identical to the prior knowledge assessment). Four 
questions tested knowledge of the text-base (i.e., explicit and inferential questions), and 
seven tested the formation of the mental model of the text (i.e., questions that required 
explanation and application to novel situations). On text-based comprehension, low 
knowledge readers performed better on explicit questions after reading the traditional 
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text, whereas high knowledge readers did better on inferential questions in the conceptual 
change condition. Students with both levels of prior knowledge, however, had better 
performance on mental model questions with the conceptual change text.  
All of the studies reviewed thus far were conducted in artificial testing sessions, 
calling the ecological validity of refutation texts into question. Diakidoy, Kendeou, and 
Ioannides (2003) assigned ten intact sixth grade classrooms to one of three learning 
conditions: refutation, expository, or standard instruction (i.e., no text). One lesson on the 
concept of energy was taught by each classroom teacher and was observed by the 
researchers for fidelity. All lessons included activities and demonstrations, but students in 
the two text conditions read instead of answering review questions. Posttest performance 
on short answer and multiple choice questions one day and one month after instruction 
revealed that classrooms that read the refutation text outperformed classrooms in the two 
other conditions, between which there were no differences. Although prior knowledge 
was not assessed, the authors reported that the refutation text influenced performance 
only on questions that assessed hypothesized preconceptions. 
Other classroom-based investigations have been conducted with high school 
science classes, although comparisons were not made between refutation texts and 
traditional expository texts. Instead, these studies sought to determine whether other 
instructional variables mitigated the refutation text effect. Hynd and colleagues (1994) 
demonstrated that ninth and tenth grade students with misconceptions regarding projectile 
motion benefited the most from reading a refutation text and seeing a demonstration 
(67% of students in this condition revised their misconceptions). With the addition of a 
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small group discussion of the concept, conceptual change occurred 50% of the time. Only 
37% of students revised their misconceptions when they read the refutation text and 
participated in a discussion, indicating that student-to-student discussion actually 
hindered performance. Guzzetti, Williams, Skeels, and Wu (1997), however, found that 
discussions with a researcher were necessary to clarify the scientific conception for high 
school students with misconceptions and those with no prior knowledge about projectile 
motion. These findings suggest that conceptual change is fostered by a combination of 
refutation text, demonstration, and perhaps adult guided discussions. 
In sum, prior knowledge misconceptions hinder science text comprehension for 
students of all ages. Refutation texts directly confront and refute these misconceptions 
and offer correct scientific conceptions. Reading refutation texts results in significantly 
more conceptual change than reading traditional expository texts. In no case, though, did 
all participants who read a refutation text demonstrate conceptual change. This fact has 
prompted researchers to investigate other influences on conceptual change. 
Disciplinary Attitudes/Dispositions 
The focus on cognitive factors such as prior knowledge and misconceptions in 
conceptual change research has been labeled cold conceptual change (Pintrich, Marx, & 
Boyle, 1993). Despite the strong relationship between prior knowledge and performance, 
other learning variables are essential for student performance. Dochy, Segers, and Buehl 
(1999) contend that “it would be foolhardy to conclude that learning is completely 
directed by a learner’s preexisting knowledge base” (p. 171). A “warmer” view of 
conceptual change (Sinatra, 2005) incorporates situation-specific factors that reflect 
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students’ epistemological beliefs, self-efficacy, and interests. These learner dispositions 
influence the likelihood of conceptual change (Pintrich et al., 1993). The three 
disciplinary attitudes and dispositions as conceptualized for this study are discussed 
separately along with findings from the research on their role in conceptual change.  
Epistemological beliefs. Epistemological beliefs are “individual’s beliefs about 
the nature of knowledge and the process of knowing” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, p. 117). 
Evidence suggests that students’ epistemological knowledge is discipline-specific. 
Students tend to view science as certain, with discrete facts to be learned from sources of 
authority (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). There is, however, a progression from an absolute 
belief in knowledge as certain and verifiable by fact, to a belief that all claims in science 
are opinions and thus equally valid, to an evaluative belief that acknowledges scientific 
uncertainty and the importance of evaluation. Results of a longitudinal study indicate that 
some epistemological development occurs during high school (Schommer, Calvert, 
Gariglietti, & Bajaj, 1997). Epistemological understanding influences the disposition 
(versus the competence) to engage in scientific thinking (Kuhn & Dean, 2002). Pintrich 
(1999, cited in Sinatra, 2005) proposed that a belief in simple and certain knowledge can 
inhibit conceptual change, whereas a belief in uncertain and constructed knowledge in 
science can lead to the deep processing required to abandon misconceptions.  
Empirical findings confirm the suggested relationship between epistemological 
beliefs and conceptual change. For example, high school students with more advanced 
epistemological beliefs were more likely than students with less advanced beliefs to 
abandon their misconceptions after reading a refutation text on the Newtonian theory of 
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motion (Qian & Alvermann, 1995). Key epistemological beliefs for conceptual change 
were that scientific knowledge is complex and uncertain and that learning is a gradual 
process. Alternatively, it has been demonstrated that belief in authoritative sources of 
knowledge and scientists as experts hinders conceptual change (Mason, 2001).  
Although not conducted with refutation text, findings from another study 
(Windschitl & Andre, 1998) have implications for epistemological beliefs and conceptual 
change. University students in a constructivist learning condition (i.e., students formed 
and tested their own hypotheses) demonstrated greater conceptual change than those in an 
objectivist learning condition (i.e., students followed prescribed written instructions), but 
learning condition interacted with epistemological beliefs. Students with more 
sophisticated epistemological beliefs benefited from the constructivist condition in which 
they were allowed to explore the new material, whereas students who believed in simple 
and certain knowledge demonstrated more conceptual change when they followed 
prescribed instructions.  
Self-efficacy. Motivation is comprised of many different constructs and has been 
speculated to induce conceptual change because it is associated with deeper processing of 
text. Self-efficacy is one aspect of the expectancy component of motivation (Pintrich & 
De Groot, 1990). These are students’ beliefs that they are able to complete a task and that 
they are responsible for their performance. A student’s level of self-efficacy and control 
answers the question, “Can I do this task?” Defined in terms of confidence in one’s 
ability to learn (versus one’s knowledge), high self-efficacy should enhance conceptual 
change because it is associated with mastery goals, which increase the likelihood that a 
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student recognizes that a change in conception is required to learn the material 
(Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2003).  
Although not concerned with conceptual change per se, research has 
demonstrated that self-efficacy makes an independent contribution to science 
achievement for students in middle school (Britner & Pajares, 2006), high school 
(Kupermintz, 2002; Lau & Roeser, 2002), and college (Andrew, 1998). Results of a 
correlational study conducted with students in seventh grade science and English classes 
revealed that aspects of motivation are related to one another (Pintrich & De Groot, 
1990). The Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ) revealed that higher 
levels of self-efficacy were associated with higher levels of cognitive strategy use, self-
regulation (i.e., a mastery goal orientation), and higher levels of student achievement on 
in-class work, homework, quizzes, tests, essays, and reports. One study (Hynd, Holschuh, 
& Nist, 2000) directly investigated the impact of self-efficacy on conceptual change, and 
it collapsed several components of motivation (including interest, self-efficacy, and 
grades). Findings revealed that high school students’ motivation to learn was important 
for conceptual change in physics.  
Interest. Research distinguishes between two types of interest. Individual interest 
relates to personal interest, is relatively stable, and is associated with increased 
knowledge and value. Situational interest is elicited from environmental stimuli (e.g., 
features of a text) and is associated with focused attention. The two forms of interest 
likely interact, leading to more elaborate and deeper processing of texts (Hidi, 2002; 
Schiefele, 1999). Another type of interest, and the focus of the current research, is topic 
25 
 
 
 
interest. Topic interest is comprised of intrinsic feeling-related (i.e., feelings associated 
with a topic, such as enjoyment) and value-related (i.e., the personal significance of a 
topic) beliefs. Topic interest is particularly relevant to reading because the topics students 
are asked to learn about are typically encountered in titles of text passages. Though there 
is disagreement as to whether topic interest is a form of individual or situational interest 
(Ainley, Hidi, & Berndorff, 2002; Hidi, 2001), ratings made prior to reading are more 
closely related to individual interest.  
In a review of 22 studies of narrative and expository text comprehension (i.e., not 
restricted to science), the average correlation between topic interest and text learning was 
.27 (p < .01) and was independent of text length, type of text or comprehension 
assessment, age, reading ability, and prior knowledge (Schiefele, 1999). Other studies 
revealed that topic interest affected deep-level learning more than surface-level learning 
and seemed to have a particular effect on the propositional processing of text (Hidi, 2001; 
Schiefele, 1999). This deeper processing is one characteristic that promotes conceptual 
change (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). 
There is disagreement in the literature about the relationship between prior 
knowledge and interest, and whether the impact of interest on learning is independent of 
the effects of prior knowledge. Conflicting findings are due in large part to the 
differences in how interest has been conceptualized and assessed (cf. Tobias, 1994). 
Some researchers, (e.g., Renninger, Ewen, & Lasher, 2002) confound knowledge and 
interest by including stored knowledge as a component of interest. There is a need for 
research that assesses interest and prior knowledge of the same topic to determine the 
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relationship between the two and the independent contributions of each to 
comprehension. This call has been minimally answered by research on conceptual 
change. 
Andre and Windschitl (2003) presented data from university students who read 
traditional or refutation texts on electric circuits. Students in the refutation condition 
outperformed the others, but gender (i.e., male) and verbal ability were also significantly 
related to performance. Topic interest was significantly related to performance, which 
reduced the influence of gender. Interest (as measured by a 12-item questionnaire) 
influenced conceptual understanding regardless of the type of text read. Interest and 
previous experience were correlated, but measures of prior knowledge were not collected. 
It is possible that the influence of interest on conceptual change was indirect (i.e., through 
its influence on prior knowledge). In another experiment, Andre and Windschitl (2003) 
reasoned that interest would influence conceptual change independently of prior 
knowledge. Results of a path analysis revealed that, as hypothesized, interest had a 
significant direct effect on posttest performance (.14) above and beyond the direct effect 
of pretest performance (.64). Interest also had an indirect effect on conceptual change, 
through its influence on previous experience.  
Students who report high interest in a topic may very well demonstrate small 
amounts of conceptual change. Venville and Treagust (1998) interviewed high school 
students to determine their understanding of and interest in genetics. Students tended to 
be interested in the hereditary aspects of genetics, rather than the microscopic aspects that 
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were critical to conceptual change. The differences in findings on interest and conceptual 
change are likely due to how interest was measured and thus defined. 
Studies investigating multiple disciplinary attitudes and dispositions. There are 
few studies investigating the effect of multiple disciplinary attitudes and dispositions on 
science text comprehension. Mason and Boscolo (2004) investigated the effects of 
domain-general epistemological understanding (i.e., not related to science knowledge) 
and topic interest on grade 10 and 11 students’ comprehension of an expository science 
text. The controversial topic of genetically modified food was used. Students with 
advanced epistemological beliefs tended to write text conclusions that recognized the 
need for further scientific research on the matter and/or supported one position by 
arguing against the other. Advanced beliefs were also associated with a change in 
personal opinion on genetically modified food to a more neutral position. Higher levels of 
both epistemological understanding and topic interest were associated with richer 
responses to open-ended comprehension questions but did not affect performance on 
multiple-choice questions. There were no interactions between epistemological 
understandings and topic interest; higher topic interest did not compensate for less 
advanced epistemological beliefs. 
A more recent study is of particular relevance to the current research because it 
investigated the effects of epistemological beliefs and topic interest on conceptual change 
(Mason, Gava, & Boldrin, 2008). Participants were fifth grade students who read either a 
traditional or refutation text about light. Epistemological beliefs (less advanced and more 
advanced) and topic interest (low and high) were also between-subject variables. 
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Participants who read the refutation text demonstrated more conceptual change than those 
who read the expository text. The standardized reading comprehension covariate 
explained a significant amount of variance and correlated significantly with knowledge at 
the three testing times (pre-, post- and delayed posttest). Prior topic knowledge and 
interest were not correlated. Higher topic interest was associated with greater conceptual 
change on its own, as well as through an interaction with epistemological beliefs and 
refutation text. Advanced epistemological beliefs facilitated conceptual change through 
its interaction with interest and refutation text. The refutation text was beneficial to 
students with and without advantageous levels of interest and epistemological beliefs. 
None of the variables affected shallow levels of text understanding assessed by factual 
text retention questions.  
Purpose of the Current Research 
Numerous studies have shown an advantage of refutation text over traditional 
expository text when students have misconceptions in science. These findings have been 
extended by research that uncovers other variables that promote learning and conceptual 
change. This study had two aims. The first aim was to determine whether prior 
knowledge impacted science text comprehension. Two conditions of prior knowledge 
were investigated: when students (a) held misconceptions and (b) had incomplete prior 
knowledge.  The second aim was to uncover the disciplinary attitudes and dispositions 
that facilitated science text comprehension. The “warm” constructs that have been shown 
to affect conceptual change have, for the most part, been investigated singularly. This 
study was the first to investigate three related to conceptual change: epistemological 
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beliefs, interest, and self-efficacy. Furthermore, the impact of these variables was 
investigated in the presence of misconceptions and incomplete prior knowledge.  
The following research questions and hypotheses correspond to the aims of the study: 
1) Is science text comprehension impacted by type of prior knowledge 
(misconception or incomplete)? It was hypothesized that there would be greater 
improvement between the prior knowledge and comprehension assessments when 
students held misconceptions than when their prior knowledge was incomplete. 
Misconceptions explicitly refuted by a text are more likely to be corrected (i.e., 
conceptual change) than incomplete knowledge is to be gained from traditional 
expository texts (i.e., knowledge enrichment). 
2) Do disciplinary attitudes and dispositions moderate the impact of prior 
knowledge on science text comprehension? It was hypothesized that students with 
more advanced levels of epistemological beliefs, self-efficacy, and topic interest 
would demonstrate greater improvements between their prior knowledge and 
comprehension assessments than students with lower levels. Epistemological 
beliefs were hypothesized to have a greater impact on conceptual change learning 
than knowledge enrichment.
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
 
 
Participants 
Participants were 28 typically developing 14 to 15 year olds (M = 15.02 years) 
whose first language was English. Participants performed at or above the 25th percentile 
on the combined vocabulary and reading comprehension subtests of the Gates-
MacGinitie Reading Tests, 4th edition (GMRT; MacGinitie, MacGinitie, Maria, Dreyer, 
& Hughes, 2006; Level 7/9, Form S). The mean GMRT score was the 56th percentile 
(range 27th to 94th percentile). Participants were paid $10 after completion of the second 
day of testing. 
Information was obtained regarding participants’ eighth grade science end-of-
grade (EOG) scores and their current, or most recent if not currently enrolled, science 
course grade. The EOG science test assesses competencies in the North Carolina 
Standard Course of Study with 80 multiple-choice questions (North Carolina Department 
of Public Instruction [NCDPI], 2007). Scores are reported as scale scores and 
corresponding achievement levels I-IV, with grade-level proficiency defined as an 
achievement level III or above (NCDPI, 2011). The sample mean science EOG scale 
score was 153.8 (range 140 to 165), which corresponded to an achievement level III 
(NCDPI, 2008). Participants’ science course grades ranged from letter grades A to D. All 
but one participant was enrolled in an honors science course.  
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Measures and Scoring 
The GMRT (MacGinitie et al., 2006) was used as an independent measure of 
vocabulary and reading comprehension to assist in determining eligibility for the study. 
Questionnaires and assessments were developed to assess disciplinary attitudes and 
dispositions in science, prior knowledge of science topics, and science text 
comprehension. Descriptions of each measure follow. Interrater reliabilities were 
calculated for 25% of the protocols for each measure and are reported as percent of 
agreement on all questions. 
Vocabulary and Reading Comprehension 
 The GMRT (MacGinitie et al., 2006) consists of vocabulary and reading 
comprehension subtests. Each test word in the vocabulary subtest is presented in a brief 
context intended to suggest part of speech but not to provide clues to meaning. Students 
select the word or phrase that means most nearly the same as the test word. The reading 
comprehension subtest consists of short reading passages and corresponding multiple-
choice comprehension questions. The reported reliability estimates indicate strong total 
test and subtest internal consistency levels with coefficient values at or above .90.  
Participants in this study completed even-numbered vocabulary questions (22 out 
of 45) and 24 out of 48 reading comprehension questions from 5 out of 11 passages 
(passages 1, 3, 6, 9, and 11). Raw scores were calculated for each subtest; interrater 
reliability was 100%. Winter or spring norms were used depending on the date of 
assessment. Since half of the items were administered, the total raw score was doubled to 
arrive at a combined percentile rank. 
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Epistemological Beliefs 
The 12-item epistemological beliefs questionnaire (adapted from Mason, Gava, & 
Boldrin, 2008) measured beliefs about the certainty (odd numbered statements) and 
development of knowledge (even numbered statements) in science (see Appendix A). 
Participants indicated on a 5-point Likert-type scale their agreement with each item (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The scale measuring certainty was reversed so that 
lower scores reflected more advanced beliefs. Raw scores were calculated; interrater 
reliability was 100%. Mason et al. (2008) reported an alpha reliability coefficient of .73 
in their sample of 94 students in fifth grade.  
Self-Efficacy in Science 
Nine items from the MSLQ (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990) were used to assess 
participants’ self-efficacy in science (see Appendix B). Participants rated their abilities as 
compared to peers in their science class. Participants indicated on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale their agreement with each item (1 = not at all true of me, 5 = very true of me). Raw 
scores were calculated, and interrater reliability was 100%. The reported reliability for 
the self-efficacy scale in the original 44-item version was .89 in a sample of 173 students 
in seventh grade (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990). 
Topic Interest 
Interest in science topics was assessed with a 10-item questionnaire for each topic 
(see Appendix C). The questionnaires were modeled after those used by Mason et al. 
(2008) and included items that assessed feeling-related and value-related aspects of 
interest. Participants indicated on a 5-point Likert-type scale their agreement with each 
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item (1 = not at all like me, 5 = very true of me). Three items (2, 6, and 10) were reversed 
so that lower scores reflected greater interest. Interrater reliability of the raw scores was 
100%. Mason et al. (2008) reported an alpha reliability coefficient of .80. 
Science Topics 
 Two topics were selected for each type of prior knowledge investigated (i.e., 
misconception and incomplete). Previous studies on conceptual change have 
demonstrated that misconceptions about seasonal change and object motion are common. 
Topics for which participants were likely to have incomplete knowledge were chosen 
from the same areas of science as the misconception topics to control for topic selection. 
Eclipses (from earth/space science) and magnets (from physical science) represented 
topics that would be familiar to 14 and 15 year olds, but for which most would not be 
able to give scientific explanations. A high school science teacher confirmed that students 
had not covered the topics in her course. 
Prior Knowledge and Science Text Comprehension 
Prior knowledge of each science topic was assessed with a written 9-item pretest 
consisting of four open-ended and five multiple-choice questions (adapted from 
Broughton et al., 2010; see Appendix D). Common misconceptions were taken into 
account when composing the multiple-choice answer options. Comprehension 
assessments were identical to the prior knowledge assessments. Raw scores were 
calculated for prior knowledge and comprehension assessments. Interrater reliability was 
93% and 94%, respectively. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. Broughton 
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et al. (2010) reported an alpha value of .83 for their 5-item multiple-choice concept 
inventory.  
Prior knowledge and comprehension assessments for each topic were also coded 
to describe the nature of knowledge they elicited. Prior knowledge of seasonal change 
and object motion could be categorized as a misconception, incomplete knowledge, or 
correct knowledge. Assessments were first examined for the presence of misconceptions 
and were coded as such if the common misconception was expressed on any portion of 
the test. The common misconception for seasonal change is that it is caused by the earth’s 
distance from the sun. For object motion, it is that an object comes to a stop because of 
some internal property (e.g., weight, acceleration) of the object. Incomplete knowledge of 
seasonal change was defined by the absence of the idea that the earth’s axis tilts towards 
the sun in the summer and away from it in the winter on any applicable question. 
Incomplete knowledge of object motion was defined by the absence of knowledge that 
objects come to a stop because of external forces on any applicable question. Prior 
knowledge of seasonal change and object motion was categorized as correct by the 
presence of the above criteria on all applicable questions.  
Prior knowledge of eclipses and magnets could only be categorized as incomplete 
or correct (i.e., there are no common misconceptions for those topics). Incomplete 
knowledge of eclipses was coded if the concept that the moon or earth blocks the sun’s 
light was missing from any portion of the assessment. For magnets, prior knowledge was 
coded as incomplete if the concept that opposite poles attract was missing from any 
applicable test question. Correct knowledge of these topics was identified by the presence 
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of the respective concepts on all applicable questions. Interrater reliability for these 
categorizations of knowledge was 98%. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
Science Texts 
Four science passages were written for this study: two refutation and two 
traditional expository (see Appendix E). Passages are controlled for length and 
complexity (see Appendix E for passage-specific values). Lexile® measures 
(http://www.lexile.com/analyzer/) take into consideration word count, mean sentence 
length, and mean log word frequency. The mid-year interquartile lexile range for 
typically developing students in the 9th grade is 855L to 1165L (MetaMetrics, 2012). 
Lexile measures for the passages in this study ranged from 980L to 1130L. The Gunning 
Fog index of readability (http://gunning-fog-index.com/index.html), a weighted average 
of the number of words per sentence and the number of complex (i.e., 3+ syllable) words, 
is an estimate of the number of years of formal education needed to understand a text. 
Fog indexes for passages in this study ranged from 8.58 to 9.62.  
Procedure 
 Testing was performed in group settings. On Day 1, participants completed the 
GMRT subtests; questionnaires on epistemological beliefs, topic interests, and self-
efficacy; and prior knowledge assessments. Presentation of measures was 
counterbalanced to account for possible fatigue effects. The reading comprehension 
subtest, the vocabulary subtest, and the topic interest and associated prior knowledge 
assessments were always the first three measures administered, with the four individual 
topic interest/prior knowledge assessments counterbalanced within that rotation. The 
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epistemological beliefs and self-efficacy questionnaires were always the last two 
measures administered. Participants took between approximately 30 minutes and 1 hour 
to complete Day 1 testing.  
On Day 2, participants read four short science texts. After reading each passage, 
they completed the written comprehension assessment. Presentation of passages and 
corresponding comprehension assessments was counterbalanced. Day two of testing took 
approximately 30 to 45 minutes. There was typically a delay of five or seven days 
between the first and second days of testing, although the length of delay was not critical 
to the methodology since science text comprehension assessments were administered on 
the same day participants read the science passages.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
A total of 112 observations were obtained (28 participants x 4 topics). Table 1 
presents mean total and open-ended scores for the prior knowledge and comprehension 
assessments in each topic. Paired sample t-tests compared average performance between 
the two topics in each type of prior knowledge to determine if participants had more prior 
knowledge or better passage comprehension of one topic than another, as assessed by 
performance on the assessments as a whole and on only the open-ended portion of the 
assessments. In the two misconception topics, all average scores except open-ended 
comprehension were significantly higher for object motion than for seasonal change 
(total prior knowledge: t(27) = 2.30, p < .05; open-ended prior knowledge: t(27) = 3.38, p 
< .01; total comprehension: t(27) = 2.94, p < .01; open-ended comprehension: t(27) = 
1.05, p = .30). In the incomplete knowledge topics, average scores for all eclipse 
assessments were higher than those for magnets (total prior knowledge: t(27) = 2.15, p < 
.05; open-ended prior knowledge: t(27) = 7.13, p < .01; total comprehension: t(27) = 
2.13, p < .05; open-ended prior knowledge: t(27) = 4.67, p < .01).  
Paired samples correlations, reported in Table 2, revealed significant or near 
significant moderate correlations between the total prior knowledge and total 
comprehension scores for the two topics in each type of prior knowledge. Open-ended 
scores were not correlated. Collapsed total scores are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
3
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Table 1. Mean Prior Knowledge and Comprehension Assessment Scores by Topic 
 Misconception  Incomplete 
 Prior Know Comp  Prior Know Comp 
Seasonal Change   Eclipses   
Total (max = 9) 2.86 (1.80) 3.96 (2.22) Total (max = 9) 3.64 (2.11) 5.00 (1.91) 
Open-ended (max = 4) 1.04 (1.14) 1.93 (1.27) Open-ended (max = 4) 2.04 (1.32) 2.75 (1.21) 
Object Motion   Magnets   
Total (max = 9) 3.71 (1.72) 5.18 (2.00) Total (max = 9) 2.86 (1.30) 4.18 (1.89) 
Open-ended (max = 4) 1.93 (1.02) 2.21 (1.13) Open-ended (max = 4) 0.32 (0.48) 1.57 (1.17) 
Collapsed   Collapsed   
Total (max = 18) 6.57 (2.91) 9.11 (3.64) Total (max = 18) 6.46 (2.89) 9.18 (3.20) 
Open-ended (max = 8) 2.96 (1.60) 4.11 (1.95) Open-ended (max = 8) 2.32 (1.49) 4.32 (1.96) 
Note. N = 28; Know = knowledge; Comp = Comprehension
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Table 2. Total and Open-Ended Score Correlations for Misconception and Incomplete 
Knowledge Topics 
 
Topics Total  Open-Ended  
Seasons – Motion Prior Knowledge .37a Prior Knowledge .13 
 Comprehension .47* Comprehension .29 
Eclipses – Magnets  Prior Knowledge .44* Prior Knowledge .28 
 Comprehension .42* Comprehension .37b 
*p < .05, a p = .053, b p = .054 
 
 
Prior knowledge and comprehension scores for seasonal change and object 
motion were collapsed to obtain one pre- and posttest misconception score, respectively. 
Scores were collapsed in the same manner for eclipses and magnets to obtain pre- and 
posttest incomplete knowledge scores. Each of the collapsed pre- and posttest scores, 
except prior knowledge of incomplete knowledge topics, was significantly correlated 
with the combined vocabulary and reading comprehension subtest percentiles 
(misconception prior knowledge: r(28) = .61, p < .01; misconception comprehension: 
r(28) = .66, p < .01; incomplete prior knowledge: r(28) = .25, p = .20; incomplete 
comprehension: r(28) = .53, p < .01).  
A 2 (Time: pretest, posttest) x 2 (Type of Prior Knowledge: misconception, 
incomplete) repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with combined 
reading comprehension and vocabulary percentile rank entered as the covariate, was 
conducted to examine for changes between prior knowledge and comprehension. The 
covariate was not significant, F(1,26) = 3.17, p = .09, so it was removed for further 
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analysis. A 2 (Time) x 2 (Type of Prior Knowledge) repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) revealed a statistically significant increase in scores from pre- to 
posttest, F(1, 27) = 32.80, p < .01, ηp
2 = .55, but that type of prior knowledge did not 
interact with time, F(1, 27) = .06, p = .81. It should be noted that the observed power for 
the time x type of prior knowledge interaction was .06, indicating that the test was 
underpowered.  
 Mean epistemological belief, self-efficacy, and topic interest scores are reported 
in Table 3. Epistemological beliefs and self-efficacy were not significantly correlated, 
r(28) = .314, p = .10, indicating that participants with relatively high scores in one area 
did not necessarily have high scores in the other. Mean interest scores for the incomplete 
knowledge topics (i.e., eclipses and magnets) were significantly different. Average 
interest scores for the misconception topics (i.e., seasonal change and object motion) 
were similar. Interest and prior knowledge scores for three topics were not significantly 
correlated (seasons: r(28) = .172, p = .38; motion: r(28) = .08, p = .69; magnets: r(28) = 
.04, p = .83). The interest and prior knowledge scores for eclipses, the topic with the 
highest mean interest score, were significantly correlated, r(28) = .43, p < .05.  
Separate 2 (Time) x 2 (Type of Prior Knowledge) repeated measures analyses of 
covariance (ANCOVAs) were conducted to determine whether disciplinary attitudes and 
dispositions moderated science text comprehension. When epistemological beliefs score 
was entered as the covariate, a significant Time x Epistemological Beliefs interaction was 
obtained, F(1, 26) = 7.76, p < .01, ηp
2 = .23, indicating that participants with more
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 Table 3. Mean Disciplinary Attitudes/Dispositions Scores 
 Epistemological Beliefs  Self-Efficacy  Topic Interest 
 (max = 60) (max = 45) Seasons 
(max = 50) 
Motion 
(max = 50) 
Eclipses 
(max = 50) 
Magnets 
(max = 50) 
M 48.86 34.61 28.25 27.79 31.29*
 
26.43* 
SD 5.90 6.70 6.34 7.12 8.11 6.45 
Median 49.50 36.00 29.00 27.50 31.50 26.50 
1st quartile 36 – 46 19 – 31 16 – 22 12 – 24 18 – 24 14 – 22 
2nd quartile 44 – 49 33 – 36 24 – 28 25 – 27 28 – 31 23 – 26 
3rd quartile 50 – 51 37 – 39 30 – 33 28 – 32 32 – 37 27 – 30 
4th quartile 53 – 60 41 – 44 34 – 41 33 – 46 39 – 46 31 – 42 
 Note: N = 28, * p < .05
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advanced epistemological beliefs demonstrated greater pre- to posttest score increases. 
The Time x Type of Prior Knowledge x Epistemological Beliefs interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 26) = 2.22, p = .15, indicating that the moderation of epistemological 
beliefs on change over time did not vary by type of prior knowledge (i.e., misconception 
or incomplete). It should be noted that the observed power of this three-way interaction 
was .30, indicating that with a larger sample size, a significant effect might be found.  
 Self-efficacy score did not significantly moderate pre- to posttest performance, 
F(1, 26) = 2.92, p = .10. The observed power of this test was relatively high at .38, 
indicating that a larger sample size might reveal a significant effect of this two-way 
interaction. Self-efficacy score was not correlated with current science course grade, 
r(28) = .35, p = .07, or eighth grade science EOG test score, r(26) = -.06, p = .76. 
To determine whether or not topic interest moderated science text comprehension, 
interest scores for each of the four topics were averaged to obtain one topic interest score. 
Averaging the interest scores assumes that a participant had high, moderate, or low 
interest scores in all four topics. See Table 4 for topic interest correlations.  
 
Table 4. Correlations Among Topic Interest Scores 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1. Seasons interest 1.00    
2. Motion interest .28 1.00   
3. Eclipses interest .17 .29 1.00  
4. Magnets interest .44* .56** .19 1.00 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Average interest score did not moderate pre- to posttest performance, F(1, 26) = 
.00, p = .99. Because eclipses had the highest topic interest and was the only topic for 
which interest was significantly correlated with prior knowledge, it was examined 
separately to determine if it moderated change over time. The interaction of time and 
topic interest was not significant for eclipses, F(1,26) = 1.93, p = .18. 
The initial analyses treated the knowledge assessed by the pretests as valid 
representations of the type of prior knowledge (i.e., misconception or incomplete) that the 
topics were chosen to elicit on an a priori basis. Further analysis of the data is based on 
the categorization of prior knowledge as either a misconception or incomplete as assessed 
by the pretests, reflecting the goals of the study. Average misconception prior knowledge 
and comprehension scores were calculated for participants who demonstrated a common 
misconception on either or both of the pretests for seasonal change and object motion. 
Average incomplete prior knowledge and comprehension scores were calculated for 
participants who demonstrated incomplete knowledge on the pretests for any of the four 
topics. Mean scores are reported in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Mean Prior Knowledge and Comprehension Scores by Categorized Type of 
Prior Knowledge  
 
 Prior Knowledge Comprehension 
Misconception  2.30 (1.26) 4.00 (1.97) 
Incomplete  2.84 (1.39) 4.57 (1.62) 
Note. n = 22; maximum score = 9 
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A 2 (Time: pretest, posttest) x 2 (Type of Prior Knowledge: misconception, 
incomplete) repeated measures ANOVA was performed with the recalculated average 
scores for the subsample of 22 participants who demonstrated at least one instance each 
of misconceptions and incomplete knowledge. As before, the main effect of time, F(1, 
21) = 42.03, p < .01, ηp
2 = .67, confirmed that scores increased from pre- to posttest. The 
main effect of prior knowledge was not significant, F(1, 21) = 3.08, p = .09, indicating 
that, although scores for incomplete knowledge were higher, they were not significantly 
different from those of misconceptions. There was not a significant interaction between 
time and prior knowledge, F(1, 21) = .02, p = .88, indicating that the observed increase in 
pre- and posttest scores did not depend on type of prior knowledge. 
Separate 2 (Time) x 2 (Type of Prior Knowledge) repeated measures ANCOVAs 
were conducted to determine whether epistemological beliefs, self-efficacy, or topic 
interest moderated science text comprehension. With a reduced sample size, the 
interaction between time and epistemological beliefs was no longer significant, F(1, 20) = 
.76, p = .39. The Time x Type of Prior Knowledge x Epistemological Beliefs interaction 
was also not significant, F(1, 20) = 2.03, p = .17, but the test statistics and observed 
power (.27) were similar to the analysis performed with the complete sample. This 
indicates a high likelihood that the hypothesized three-way effect would be detected with 
a larger sample size. Self-efficacy did not moderate pre- to posttest score increases, F(1, 
20) = .38, p = .55. To determine the impact of interest, participants’ mean interest scores 
were recalculated by averaging the interest scores of the topics for which they 
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demonstrated an actual misconception and incomplete knowledge. Interest did not 
moderate the change in pre- to posttest score, F(1, 20) = .01, p = .92.  
Post-Hoc Analyses 
 Several post-hoc analyses of the data were conducted to determine what, if any, 
patterns were present that might provide a better explanation of the data. The first set of 
analyses describes the nature of knowledge as revealed by the prior knowledge 
assessments, as well as the type of learning that ensued. The second set of analyses 
explores the relationship between disciplinary attitudes and dispositions and the two 
types of learning investigated in this study. Data from the entire sample were used for 
these analyses.  
Type of Prior Knowledge, Learning, and Text 
Recall that knowledge demonstrated on the prior knowledge and comprehension 
assessments could be categorized as one of three types: a misconception, incomplete, or 
correct. Based on these distinctions, nine prior knowledge/comprehension groups were 
formed. Three groups consisted of observations of prior knowledge misconceptions that 
were followed by comprehension that was either a misconception, incomplete, or correct. 
Three groups consisted of incomplete prior knowledge followed by misconception, 
incomplete, or correct comprehension. Finally, three groups consisted of observations of 
correct prior knowledge followed by one of the three types of knowledge at 
comprehension. Table 6 presents the number of observations in each group by topic.
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 Table 6. Prior Knowledge/Comprehension Group Membership 
Prior Knowledge Misconception Incomplete Correct  
Comprehension Misc Incom Corr Misc Incom Corr Misc Incom Corr Subtotal 
Seasons 12 4 2 2 2 6 0 0 0 28 
Motion 2 3 4 0 3 6 1 1 8 28 
Eclipses -- -- -- -- 6 9 -- 1 12 28 
Magnets -- -- -- -- 9 10 -- 1 8 28 
Subtotal 14 7 6 2 20 31 1 3 28  
Total 27 53 32 112 
 Note. Misc = misconception; Incom = incomplete; Corr = correct
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Almost half (48.21%, 27/56) of the prior knowledge assessments of the topics for 
which a common misconception could be held actually revealed a misconception. 
Nineteen of the remaining prior knowledge assessments of the misconception topics 
actually revealed incomplete prior knowledge. Almost two-thirds (60.71%, 34/56) of the 
assessments designed to reveal incomplete knowledge actually did so. A within-person 
analysis of the type of prior knowledge for each topic revealed that 23 participants 
demonstrated at least one misconception, 4 demonstrated misconceptions on both topics, 
27 demonstrated at least one instance of incomplete prior knowledge, and 21 
demonstrated at least one instance of correct prior knowledge. Although it was possible 
to have incomplete or correct prior knowledge of all four topics, no participant exhibited 
this pattern. 
It was very difficult to overcome a misconception and demonstrate correct 
knowledge on the corresponding comprehension assessment. Although misconceptions 
were abandoned about half of the time (48.15%, 13/27), conceptual change occurred less 
than one quarter of the time (22.22%, 6/27). When prior knowledge was incomplete, it 
was more likely that posttest knowledge was correct (58.49%, 31/53) than incomplete 
(37.74%, 20/53). Although the initial analyses did not reveal an interaction between time 
and type of prior knowledge, knowledge enrichment (i.e., incomplete prior knowledge 
improved to correct knowledge) was actually almost three times as likely as conceptual 
change (i.e., prior knowledge misconceptions improved to correct knowledge). 
 Observations of incomplete prior knowledge were inspected separately for the 
two misconception topics and the two incomplete knowledge topics in order to make 
48 
 
       
 
comparisons between refutation and traditional expository texts. There were 19 
observations of incomplete knowledge for seasonal change and object motion; 34 for 
eclipses and magnets (see Table 6). Knowledge enrichment was more likely after 
participants read refutation texts (63.16%) than when traditional expository texts were 
read (55.88%).  
Disciplinary Attitudes/Dispositions and Learning 
 Prior knowledge/comprehension group membership for each topic was examined 
by rank ordering participants by epistemological belief scores. Self-efficacy and topic 
interest scores for instances of conceptual change and knowledge enrichment were noted. 
These scores were also noted for instances of missed opportunities for conceptual change 
(i.e., prior knowledge misconception followed by either a misconception or incomplete 
knowledge at comprehension) and knowledge enrichment (i.e., incomplete prior 
knowledge followed by either a misconception or incomplete knowledge at 
comprehension). These scores were inspected to determine whether any distinctions 
existed.  
Conceptual change. Each of the six observations of conceptual change came from 
a different participant, 5 of whom demonstrated only one misconception. The 
epistemological belief scores of these 6 participants fell at or above the 25th percentile. 
Within this range of epistemological belief scores there were 15 observations of missed 
opportunities for conceptual change from 13 participants (1 of whom also demonstrated 
conceptual change).  
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For observations of conceptual change, only 2 (33.3%) participants had self-
efficacy scores at or above the 50th percentile. All but one (83.3%) of the topic interest 
scores were at or above the 33rd percentile. For observations of missed conceptual change 
within the participants with epistemological belief scores at or above the 25th percentile, 5 
(38.5%) had self-efficacy scores above the 50th percentile and eight (53.3%) topic interest 
scores were at or above the 33rd percentile. Five participants with the lowest 
epistemological belief scores demonstrated six observations of missed opportunities for 
conceptual change. Four (80%) participants had self-efficacy scores above the 50th 
percentile, and five (83.3%) topic interest scores were above the 50th percentile. These 
findings indicate that conceptual change learning required a minimum level of 
epistemological understanding and that it was more likely to occur when topic interest 
was high. Self-efficacy did not seem to have a strong impact on conceptual change. 
Knowledge enrichment. The 31 instances of knowledge enrichment occurred for 
22 participants across the full range of epistemological belief scores. There were 22 
instances of missed opportunities for knowledge enrichment from 16 participants, also 
across the full range of epistemological belief scores. The self-efficacy and topic interest 
scores associated with these observations were examined for participants by the 1st, mid, 
and 4th quartiles of epistemological belief scores.  
The 8 participants with the lowest epistemological belief scores each 
demonstrated at least one instance of knowledge enrichment, for a total of nine 
observations. Half of these participants had self-efficacy scores at or above the 50th 
percentile; the other half were below the 25th percentile. Three-quarters of the 
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observations of knowledge enrichment among those with low self-efficacy scores were 
associated with topic interest scores at or above the 50th percentile, whereas 60% of the 
observations of knowledge enrichment among those with high self-efficacy also had high 
topic interest scores. There were six observations of missed opportunities for knowledge 
enrichment, each from a different participant. Half of these participants had self-efficacy 
scores above the 50th percentile; the other half were below the 25th percentile. Among 
those with low self-efficacy scores, two-thirds of the missed opportunities for knowledge 
enrichment were associated with topic interest scores at or above the 50th percentile, 
whereas one-third of the missed opportunities for knowledge enrichment among those 
with high self-efficacy also were associated with high topic interest. These findings 
suggest that, in the presence of low epistemological beliefs, high topic interest was an 
important factor for knowledge enrichment, particularly for participants with low self-
efficacy. Topic interest, however, did not compensate for low self-efficacy. 
There were nine observations of knowledge enrichment from 7 of the 13 
participants in the midquartile of epistemological belief scores. Among these, only 2 
(28.6%) participants had self-efficacy scores above the 50th percentile. The three topic 
interest scores associated with these two participants’ observations of knowledge 
enrichment were above the 50th percentile. The 5 participants with self-efficacy scores 
below the 50th percentile demonstrated six observations of knowledge enrichment, two 
(33.3%) of which were associated with topic interest scores above the 50th percentile. 
There were 13 observations of missed opportunities for knowledge enrichment in the 
midquartile range of epistemological belief scores. Of these 8 participants, half had self-
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efficacy scores at or above the 50th percentile; the other half were at the 33rd percentile. 
Among those with high self-efficacy, only one (14.3%) observation of a missed 
opportunity for knowledge enrichment was associated with a topic interest score above 
the 50th percentile. When participants had relatively lower self-efficacy, four (66.7%) 
missed opportunities for knowledge enrichment were associated with high topic interest. 
These findings suggest that with moderate levels of epistemological beliefs, the 
advantages of topic interest for knowledge enrichment diminish for those with low self-
efficacy.  
Among the 7 participants with the highest epistemological belief scores, there 
were 13 observations of knowledge enrichment (the most of any quartile). Each 
participant demonstrated at least one instance of knowledge enrichment. All but 1 
participant (85.7%) had self-efficacy scores at or above the 50th percentile, and that 
participant’s score was only one point below the median, so it is not possible to determine 
whether self-efficacy impacted knowledge enrichment in the presence of advanced 
epistemological understandings. Only six (46.2%) topic interest scores were above the 
50th percentile, indicating that topic interest did not impact knowledge enrichment in the 
presence of advanced epistemological beliefs and high self-efficacy. Among those with 
the highest epistemological belief scores there were only three observations of missed 
opportunities for knowledge enrichment from 2 participants. Both participants’ self-
efficacy scores were above the 50th percentile, and two (66.7%) of the topic interest 
scores were above the 50th percentile.  
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Conceptual change vs. knowledge enrichment. Findings confirm the hypothesis 
that epistemological beliefs would be more important for conceptual change than for 
knowledge enrichment. Conceptual change did not occur for participants with 
epistemological belief scores below the 25th percentile, whereas knowledge enrichment 
was demonstrated by participants with all levels of epistemological beliefs. There were, 
in fact, nine observations of knowledge enrichment among participants with the lowest 
epistemological beliefs. This was second only to participants with the most advanced 
epistemological beliefs, who demonstrated 13 observations of knowledge enrichment.  
Self-efficacy did not appear to directly impact either type of learning. 
Observations of knowledge enrichment were dispersed among all quartiles of self-
efficacy scores. Higher levels of self-efficacy might have compensated for the lowest 
levels of epistemological beliefs, but only for knowledge enrichment. It should be noted 
that self-efficacy scores above the 50th percentile were associated with missed 
opportunities for knowledge enrichment at least as often as they were for observations of 
knowledge enrichment. This likelihood increased as level of epistemological beliefs 
increased. 
Topic interest seems to have made an impact on both conceptual change and 
knowledge enrichment. Interest levels did not have to be has high to have an impact on 
conceptual change. Topic interest was less important for knowledge enrichment as the 
level of epistemological beliefs increased. In the 1st quartile of epistemological belief 
scores, 66.7% of the observations of knowledge enrichment were associated with high 
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topic interest. This percentage decreased to 55.6% for the midquartile and 46.2% for the 
4th quartile of epistemological belief scores. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
This study tested two hypotheses regarding science comprehension: (a) that there 
would be greater improvement between prior knowledge and comprehension assessments 
when students held misconceptions than when their prior knowledge was incomplete and 
(b) that higher levels of epistemological beliefs, self-efficacy, and topic interest would be 
associated with greater improvements. After a discussion of the findings, educational 
implications and directions for future research are offered.  
Prior Knowledge and Disciplinary Attitudes/Dispositions 
The first set of analyses considered the impact of prior knowledge on science text 
comprehension. Prior knowledge clearly had an impact on students’ comprehension of 
the different science texts. When students had correct prior knowledge (29% of the time), 
comprehension was correct 88% of the time. When prior knowledge was incorrect (71% 
of the time), comprehension was correct only 46% of the time. Comprehension was much 
better when prior knowledge was incomplete rather than when misconceptions were held. 
Fifty-nine percent of the observations of incomplete prior knowledge had correct 
comprehension, whereas only 22% of the instances of misconceptions did so. Although 
the post-hoc analyses revealed that it was more desirable for students to have incomplete 
prior knowledge than misconceptions, the repeated measures analysis did not reveal a 
significant difference between the two types of incorrect prior knowledge. The change in 
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scores between the prior knowledge and comprehension assessments for misconceptions 
and incomplete prior knowledge were essentially identical. Despite an increase in scores 
between the two assessment times, knowledge was often not correct. In the case of 
misconceptions, knowledge at comprehension was often incomplete. This study 
confirmed that misconceptions are resistant to change. Perhaps conceptual change did not 
occur as much as hypothesized because previous studies did not consider the accuracy of 
comprehension when misconceptions were abandoned. 
Not only were students much more successful at filling gaps in incomplete 
knowledge than they were abandoning misconceptions, but incomplete prior knowledge 
occurred more often than misconceptions (47% and 24%, respectively). This was because 
incomplete prior knowledge occurred for all four topics, whereas misconceptions only 
occurred for two topics. Incomplete knowledge will always be more common than 
misconceptions because incomplete knowledge can exist for any topic, even those 
associated with common misconceptions.  
Because this was the first study to investigate incomplete prior knowledge in 
science, an unexpected finding arose. Recall that participants sometimes demonstrated 
incomplete prior knowledge of the misconception topics, in which case they read 
refutation texts. This allowed a comparison between comprehension of refutation texts 
and traditional expository texts. Refutation texts were more effective than traditional 
expository texts at encouraging knowledge enrichment. Since the refutation texts 
explicitly referred to misconceptions that were not held, the refutation cues themselves 
may have alerted readers to the scientific explanations that followed.  
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The second set of analyses examined the importance of disciplinary attitudes and 
dispositions for science text comprehension. As expected, advanced epistemological 
beliefs were associated with greater improvement between prior knowledge and 
comprehension, explaining 23% of the variance. Post-hoc analyses supported the 
hypothesis that epistemological beliefs would be more important for conceptual change 
than for knowledge enrichment. All instances of conceptual change occurred for 
participants whose epistemological belief scores were at or above the 25th percentile, 
whereas knowledge enrichment occurred for participants along the full continuum of 
epistemological understandings. Previous research (e.g., Mason et al., 2008) 
dichotomized epistemological beliefs and found that participants with more advanced 
beliefs had higher conceptual change scores, particularly after reading refutation texts. 
The findings suggest that a minimum level of epistemological understandings are 
necessary for conceptual change but not for knowledge enrichment.  
The sample size was too small to detect whether or not self-efficacy affected 
science text comprehension. Post-hoc analyses indicated that self-efficacy played a 
negligible role in overcoming either type of prior knowledge. The questionnaire may 
have inflated ratings of self-efficacy because participants had to compare themselves to 
peers in their science class. Alternatively, high levels of self-efficacy can inhibit learning 
if they are associated with high levels of confidence in topic knowledge (Sinatra, 2005). 
Although this study sought to assess confidence in ability, not knowledge, the two might 
have been confounded. Though it was not significant, self-efficacy score had a small but 
negative correlation with eighth grade science EOG test score. Self-efficacy scores above 
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the median were often associated with missed opportunities for knowledge enrichment, 
indicating that strong beliefs in ability might have at times influenced beliefs about 
accuracy of knowledge. 
Topic interest did not have a significant impact on science text comprehension. 
There was no indication that the small sample size affected this analysis. Post-hoc 
analyses suggested that interest might have had a greater impact on knowledge 
enrichment than on conceptual change, but this impact lessened as the level of 
epistemological beliefs increased. Previous research has revealed that topic interest only 
impacted open-ended comprehension (Mason et al., 2008). Open-ended comprehension 
was not investigated because performance on open-ended questions in the two 
assessments for misconceptions and the two for incomplete prior knowledge were not 
correlated. The average interest score of several topics was used, which might explain 
why interest was not important in this study. 
The current findings concerning interest do add information to the debate about 
the relationship between interest and prior knowledge (Tobias, 1994). Prior knowledge 
was significantly correlated with topic interest only for the most well-liked topic (i.e., 
eclipses). Other studies have reported that prior knowledge did not correlate with interest 
(e.g., Mason et al., 2008). It may be that the topic of that study, light, was just not an 
interesting enough topic.  
Educational Implications 
Several educational implications can be drawn from the findings. Instructional 
strategies that explicitly address prior knowledge will likely bolster science text 
58 
 
       
 
comprehension. Eleventh and twelfth graders in Guzzetti (1990) often had experiences 
that would help them understand a physics concept, but they were not able to make that 
link without discussion with an adult. She offered a prior knowledge instructional model 
that illustrated how students’ prior experiences could be translated into prior knowledge. 
The instructor first provides an explanation of the concept and then elicits, with 
modeling, prior experiences from ordinary life that relate to the concept. During an 
augmented activation activity, misconceptions are addressed to create cognitive 
dissonance. Past experiences are then discussed again in light of the scientific principles.  
In another prior knowledge instructional framework, Ridgeway and Dunston 
(2000) suggest four overlapping components for conceptual change based on research on 
science instruction for students with learning disabilities. Coined P – ID – D – A (for 
Preconceptions – Induce Dissonance – Discuss – Amend), the tenets are similar to that of 
Guzzetti (1990). The instructor elicits students’ preconceptions and induces conceptual 
dissonance. A discussion ensues in which conceptions are refined and conflicts are 
resolved. The final step includes amending prior knowledge to reformulate and extend 
the new conceptions. The authors suggest specific instructional strategies to use within 
the framework and give examples from two science topics. 
The rarity of conceptual change with refutation texts means that additional 
instruction is necessary to change beliefs/concepts. Social constructivist (Maria, 2000) 
and psychosocial developmental (Swafford & Bryan, 2000) approaches to conceptual 
change acknowledge that oral and written discourse is critical. Students become a part of 
the scientific community not only by learning the nature of language and knowledge 
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generation, but also the nature of group interactions in science. These are also the goals 
of disciplinary literacy (Moje 2008a, 2008b). Group interactions in science, though, are 
often in conflict with these goals (Maria, 2000). For example, in most teacher-led 
discussions, social conformity is valued and teachers are relied upon for answers. Peer 
discussions often serve to reinforce nonscientific explanations, and hands-on activities 
can result in students being task-driven instead of seeking to understand scientific 
principles.  
For conceptual change, “instruction must undermine students’ confidence in their 
ideas without undermining their confidence in themselves as learners” (Maria, 2000, p. 
17-18). This type of instruction and learning is most likely to occur in a climate of 
collaboration and trust, in which teacher guidance is balanced with student engagement. 
Students can engage in exploratory talk using their own language, particularly if teacher 
participation is limited to guiding interactions among students (Maria, 2000). When 
science is taught as argument, discussions mirror the manner in which scientists raise 
questions and argue about what theories best explain phenomenon. Evidence can be 
collected in favor of two sides of an argument, and teacher scaffolding can help students 
recognize evidence that contradicts their prior knowledge. Such discussions are best 
suited for in-depth investigations (Swafford & Bryan, 2000).  Specific guidelines for 
conceptual change discussions, including acknowledging student ideas regardless of their 
correctness, remaining neutral during the discussion, assisting students in stating their 
ideas clearly and concisely, and summarizing the discussion from beginning to end, have 
also been offered (Eryilmaz, 2002).    
60 
 
       
 
The importance of epistemological beliefs for science text comprehension also 
has instructional implications. Instruction that helps students appreciate the tentative 
nature of knowledge in science may help them understand that it is acceptable for them to 
change their own theories (Mason, 2001). Qian and Alvermann (2000) described 
instructional approaches for epistemological beliefs. In the first, labeled criss-crossing the 
landscape, scientific concepts are examined from different perspectives and knowledge is 
assembled from different sources. These sources, including demonstrations, videos, and 
texts, often bring to light conflicting information. In reflective inquiry, information on the 
nature of science is infused into instructional science projects that span relatively in-depth 
units. Students make and test hypotheses, perform experiments, and reflect on the process 
in journals. In another approach, stories of scientists’ activities from history are used to 
help students understand that scientists do not simply make discoveries, but instead try to 
explain scientific phenomenon. Finally, routine instruction can be delivered from an 
epistemological stance instead of providing answers or assigning pages to read, which 
support authoritative beliefs about science.  
There is no one right way to deliver conceptual change instruction (Maria, 2000). 
The current findings indicate that refutation text alone is rarely sufficient for conceptual 
change learning, confirming the results of previous studies (Guzzetti et al., 1997; Hynd et 
al., 1994). It may be that a combination of instructional approaches and strategies, 
discussed above, are necessary and dependent on the nature of science topics (cf. 
Ridgeway & Dunston, 2000). Although research has focused on conceptual change 
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learning, results of this study indicate that similar instructional strategies may benefit 
knowledge enrichment.  
Directions for Future Research 
Science instruction that addresses prior knowledge and epistemological beliefs 
needs to be investigated. Concept acquisition, regardless of whether it is conceptual 
change or knowledge enrichment, is unlikely to occur from one encounter with a text. 
Research needs to identify the most efficient combination of instructional strategies for 
science, with the goal being that students learn both the knowledge and dispositions of 
the discipline.     
Future studies should also clarify the role of motivational factors. This study 
examined two motivational constructs, self-efficacy and interest, and did not support the 
hypothesis that they would moderate science text comprehension. Hynd and colleagues 
(2000) hypothesized that conceptual change learning would require higher levels of 
motivation than usual. Other findings have supported the hypothesis that topic interest 
was important for conceptual change (e.g., Andre & Windschitl, 2003; Mason et al., 
2008). It may be more productive for future research efforts to examine how different 
instructional strategies affect student motivation to learn.  
Although extra-textual factors are important agendas for future research, more 
information is needed on the textual factors involved in conceptual change and 
knowledge enrichment. Without this continued focus, science teachers may get the 
impression that they should abandon science texts in favor of lectures. This does nothing 
to improve students’ abilities to read scientific texts (Shanahan, 2012) and learn the 
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dispositions of the discipline. The linguistic challenges of science texts (cf. Fang, 2012) 
should be explored to determine whether manipulations and instruction (cf. Shanahan, 
2012) can improve readers’ access to them and, thus, help them learn new content.  
Other types of texts should be investigated to determine whether refutation texts 
are as beneficial as research has suggested. For example, intratextual persuasive texts are 
characterized by the presence of multiple authors offering opposing viewpoints in 
response to a central question (Andiliou, Ramsay, Murphy, & Fast, 2012). Intratextual 
texts could be modified for science and compared to refutation and traditional expository 
texts to examine whether one is more advantageous to conceptual change and/or 
knowledge enrichment.  
Finally, most research on science text comprehension has been conducted with 
typically developing students. Participants in the earliest studies on conceptual change 
(e.g., Alvermann & Hague, 1989; Hynd & Alvermann, 1986) were low performing 
college students, but research is desperately needed that explores scientific literacy in 
disordered populations. The impact of specific language impairment (SLI) on literacy and 
numeracy skills is well researched, but there is a dearth of information on its impact on 
science achievement (Matson & Cline, 2012). These authors reported that children with 
SLI had greater difficulty than typically developing peers on scientific reasoning tasks 
that required them to make verbal responses, particularly because they used fewer causal 
connectives (e.g., because, if, then, that’s why). Research needs to investigate what other 
aspects of science are problematic for students with language learning difficulties and the 
additional supports they need to become active participants in scientific literacy.  
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Limitations 
There are several limitations to this study. Many important findings were not a 
priori considerations or hypotheses, so they must be considered with extreme caution. 
These findings do, however, provide insight into the problems faced by readers with 
inaccurate prior knowledge in science. The sample size was inadequate to detect 
interactions between type of prior knowledge and the disciplinary attitudes and 
dispositions. Epistemological beliefs, but not self-efficacy or topic interest, had an effect 
on the overall score increase between prior knowledge and comprehension in the sample. 
Though it is not possible to rule out the importance of the other factors, findings indicate 
that epistemological beliefs are more important for science text comprehension than self-
efficacy and interest. This is encouraging since the nature of science can be taught 
alongside science content (e.g., Qian & Alvermann, 2000), whereas topic interest and 
self-efficacy cannot be taught.  
Another limitation was the absence of a measure that evaluated students’ levels of 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction with their prior knowledge, and at no point was the accuracy 
of their prior knowledge revealed to them. It is not possible to tell, then, whether or not 
participants were dissatisfied with their prior knowledge, which may be an important 
factor for conceptual change. Participants had only one encounter with the texts and were 
not allowed to look back at them during the comprehension assessments. This does not 
reflect how students learn information in naturalistic settings. The texts did not contain 
diagrams, which are common in science texts. Finally, comprehension should also have 
been evaluated at least one week later to determine whether knowledge was maintained. 
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Conclusion 
 This study was an important first step in understanding the influence of different 
types of prior knowledge on science text comprehension. When students understand the 
gist of a science topic, they demonstrate excellent comprehension of the science passages. 
When prior knowledge is inaccurate, it is better if the knowledge is incomplete rather 
than a misconception. It is easier to fill gaps in knowledge than it is to replace 
misconceptions with appropriate scientific knowledge. When misconceptions are held, 
changes in knowledge require relatively advanced levels of epistemological beliefs. 
These beliefs reflect the understanding that it is permissible for ideas in science to 
change. 
Considerable research has focused on the use of refutation texts to promote 
conceptual change. The findings of the present study, however, indicate that simply 
reading refutation texts typically does not result in students replacing misconceptions 
with appropriate scientific understandings. It is important for future research to 
empirically validate more effective ways of helping students abandon misconceptions. 
Collaborative efforts among researchers, clinicians, and educators offer the best hope that 
science teachers will one day use the most effective instructional strategies to teach 
science.  
65 
 
       
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Ainley, M., Hidi, S., & Berndorff, D. (2002). Interest, learning, and the psychological  
 processes that mediate their relationship. Journal of Educational Psychology, 94, 
 545-561. doi: 10.1037//0022-0663.94.3.545 
 
Alexander, P. A. (1998). Positioning conceptual change within a model of domain  
literacy. In B. Guzzetti, & C. Hynd (Eds.), Perspectives on conceptual change: 
Multiple ways to understand knowing and learning in a complex world (pp. 55-
76). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Alvermann, D. E., & Hague, S. A. (1989). Comprehension of counterintuitive science  
text: Effects of prior knowledge and text structure. Journal of Educational 
Research, 82, 197-202. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/27540341 
 
Alvermann D. E., Smith, L. C., & Readence, J. E. (1985). Prior knowledge activation and 
 the comprehension of compatible and incompatible text. Reading Research 
 Quarterly, 20, 420-436. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/747852 
 
Andiliou, A., Ramsay, C. M., Murphy, P. K., & Fast, J. (2012). Weighing opposing  
positions: Examining the effects of intratextual persuasive messages on students’ 
knowledge and beliefs. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 37, 113-127. doi: 
10.1016/j.cedpsych.2011.10.001 
 
Andre, T., & Windschitl, M. (2003). Interest, epistemological belief, and intentional 
 conceptual change. In G. M. Sinatra & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Intentional 
 conceptual change (pp. 173-197). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Andrew, S. (1998). Self-efficacy as a predictor of academic performance in science.  
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 27, 596–603. doi: 10.1046/j.1365- 
2648.1998.00550.x 
 
Beaver, J. B., & Powers, D. (2010). Electricity and magnetism: Static electricity, current  
electricity, and magnets. Greensboro, NC: Mark Twain Media/Carson-Dellosa 
Publishing Company, Inc. 
 
Britner, S. L., & Pajares, F. (2006). Sources of science self-efficacy beliefs of middle  
school students. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 43, 485-499. doi: 
10.1002/tea.20131 
 
66 
 
       
 
Broughton, S. H., & Sinatra, G. M. (2010). Text in the science classroom: Promoting  
 engagement to facilitate conceptual change. In M. G. McKeown & L. Kucan 
 (Eds.), Bringing reading research to life (pp. 232-256). New York: The Guilford 
 Press. 
 
Broughton, S. H., Sinatra, G. M., & Reynolds, R. E. (2010). The nature of the refutation  
text effect: An investigation of attention allocation. Journal of Educational 
Research, 103, 407-423. doi: 10.1080/00220670903383101 
 
Carey, S. (1991). Knowledge acquisition: Enrichment or conceptual change? In S. Carey  
 & R. Gelman (Eds.), The epigenesis of mind: Essays on biology and cognition 
 (pp. 257-291). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Cervetti, G. N., Jaynes, C. A., & Hiebert, E. H. (2009). Increasing opportunities to 
 acquire knowledge through reading. In. E. H. Hiebert (Ed.), Reading more, 
 reading better (pp.79-100). New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Cervetti, G. N., Pearson, P. D., Bravo, M. A., & Barber, J. (2006). Reading and writing in  
the service of inquiry-based science. In R. Douglas, M. P. Klentschy, & K. Worth 
(Eds.), Linking science & literacy in the K-8 classroom (pp. 221-244). Arlington, 
VA: NSTA Press. 
 
Chi, M. T. H. (2008). Three types of conceptual change: Belief revision, mental model  
 transformation, and categorical shift. In S. Vosniadou (Ed.), International 
 handbook of research on conceptual change (pp. 61-82). New York: Routledge. 
 
Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (1993). The role of anomalous data in knowledge 
 acquisition: A theoretical framework and implications for science instruction. 
 Review of Educational Research, 63, 1-49. doi: 10.3102/00346543063001001 
 
Diakidoy, I. N., Kendeou, P., & Ioannides, C. (2003).  Reading about energy: The effects  
of text structure in science learning and conceptual change. Contemporary 
Educational Psychology, 28, 335-356. doi: 10.1016/S0361-476X(02)00039-5 
 
Diakidoy, I. N., Mouskounti, T., & Ioannides, C. (2011). Comprehension and learning  
from refutation and expository texts. Reading Research Quarterly, 46, 22-39. doi: 
10.1598/RRQ.46.1.2 
 
Dochy, F. (1996). Assessment of domain-specific and domain-transcending prior  
knowledge: Entry assessment and the use of profile analysis. In M. Birenbaum & 
F. Dochy (Eds.), Alternatives in assessment of achievements, learning processes 
and prior knowledge, (pp. 227-264). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
 
67 
 
       
 
Dochy, F., & Alexander, P. A. (1995). Mapping prior knowledge: A framework for  
 discussion among researchers. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 10, 
 225-242. doi: 10.1007/BF03172918 
 
Dochy, F., Segers, M., & Buehl, M. M. (1999). The relation between assessment  
 practices and outcomes of studies: The case on research on prior knowledge. 
 Review of Educational Research, 69, 145-186. doi: 10.3102/00346543069002145 
 
Dole, J. A. (2000). Readers, texts and conceptual change learning. Reading and Writing  
 Quarterly, 16, 99-118. doi: 10.1080/105735600277980 
 
Eryilmaz, A. (2002). Effects of conceptual assignments and conceptual change  
discussions on students’ misconceptions and achievement regarding force and 
motion. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39, 1001-1015. doi: 
10.1002/tea.10054 
 
Fang, Z. (2012). The challenges of reading disciplinary texts. In T. L. Jetton & C.  
Shanahan (Eds.), Adolescent literacy in the academic disciplines: General 
principles and practical strategies, (pp. 34-68). New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Fang, Z., & Wei, Y. (2010). Improving middle school students’ science literacy through  
reading infusion. Journal of Educational Research, 103, 262-273. doi: 
10.1080/00220670903383051 
 
Fleischman, H. L., Hopstock, P. J., Pelczar, M. P., & Shelley, B. E. (2010). Highlights  
from PISA 2009: Performance of U.S. 15-year-old students in reading, 
mathematics, and science literacy in an international context (NCES 2011-004). 
Retrieved from U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences 
website: http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011004.pdf 
 
Gardner, H. (1991). The unschooled mind: How children think and how schools should  
 teach. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Goldman, S. R., & Bisanz, G. L. (2002). Toward a functional analysis of scientific 
 genres: Implications for understanding learning processes. In J. Otero, J. A. Leόn, 
 & A. C. Graesser (Eds.), The psychology of science text comprehension (pp. 19-
 50). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Guzzetti, B. J. (1990). Effects of textual and instructional manipulations on concept  
acquisition. Reading Psychology, 11, 49-62. doi: 10.1080/0270271900110105 
 
Guzzetti, B. J. (2000). Learning counter-intuitive science concepts: What have we 
 learned from over a decade of research? Reading and Writing Quarterly, 16, 89-
 98. doi: 10.1080/105735600277971 
68 
 
       
 
Guzzetti, B. J., Williams, W. O., Skeels, S. A., & Wu, S. M. (1997). Influence of text  
structure on learning counterintuitive physics concepts. Journal of Research in 
Science Teaching, 34, 701-719. 10.1002/(SICI)1098-2736(199709)34:7<701:: 
AID-TEA3>3.0.CO;2-Q 
 
Hidi, S. (2001). Interest, reading, and learning: Theoretical and practical considerations. 
 Educational Psychology Review, 13, 191-209. doi: 10.1023/A:1016667621114 
 
Hidi, S. (2002). Reading: Interest. In J. W. Guthrie (Ed.), Encyclopedia of education, Vol. 
 6 (2nd ed., pp. 1989-1993). New York: Macmillan Reference USA. 
 
Hirsch, E. D., Jr. (2006). The knowledge deficit: Closing the shocking education gap for  
 American children. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
 
Hofer, B. K., & Pintrich, P. R. (1997). The development of epistemological theories: 
 Beliefs about knowledge and knowing and their relation to learning. Review of 
 Educational Research, 67, 88-140. doi: 10.3102/00346543067001088 
 
Hynd, C. (2002). Reading: Content areas. In J. W. Guthrie (Ed.), Encyclopedia of  
education, Vol. 6 (2nd ed., pp. 1985-1989). New York: Macmillan Reference 
USA. 
 
Hynd, C. R., & Alvermann, D. E. (1986). The role of refutation text in overcoming  
difficulty with science concepts. Journal of Reading, 29, 440-446. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40025804 
 
Hynd, C., Holschuh, J., & Nist, S. (2000). Learning complex scientific information:  
Motivation theory and its relation to student perceptions. Reading & Writing 
Quarterly, 16, 23-57. doi: 10.1080/105735600278051 
 
Hynd, C., McWhorter, J. Y., Phares, V. L., & Suttles, C. W. (1994). The role of  
instructional variables in conceptual change in high school physics topics. Journal 
of Research in Science Teaching, 31, 933-946. doi: 10.1002/tea.3660310908 
 
Jetton, T. L., & Alexander, P. A. (2004). Domains, teaching, and literacy. In T. L. Jetton  
 & J. A. Dole (Eds.), Adolescent literacy research and practice (pp. 15-39). New 
 York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Kendeou, P. & van den Broek, P. (2007). The effects of prior knowledge and text  
structure on comprehension processes during reading of scientific texts. Memory 
& Cognition, 35, 1567-1577. doi: 10.3758/BF03193491 
 
69 
 
       
 
Kuhn, D., & Dean, D. (2002). Science learning: Explanation and argumentation. In J. W. 
 Guthrie (Ed.), Encyclopedia of education, Vol. 6 (2nd ed., pp. 2166-2169). New 
 York: Macmillan Reference USA. 
 
Kupermintz, H. (2002). Affective and cognitive factors as aptitude resources in high  
school science achievement. Educational Assessment, 8, 123–137. doi: 
10.1207/S15326977EA0802_03 
 
Lau, S., & Roeser, R.W. (2002). Cognitive abilities and motivational processes in high  
school students' situational engagement and achievement in science. Educational 
Assessment, 8, 139–162. doi: 10.1207/S15326977EA0802_04 
 
Linnenbrink, E. A., & Pintrich, P. R. (2003). Achievement goals and intentional 
 conceptual change. In G. M. Sinatra & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Intentional 
 conceptual change (pp. 347-374). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
MacGinitie, W. H., MacGinitie, R. K., Maria, K., Dreyer, L. G., & Hughes, K. E. (2006).  
Gates-MacGinitie Reading Tests
® (4th ed.). Rolling Meadows, IL: Riverside 
Publishing. 
 
Maria, K. (2000). Conceptual change instruction: A social constructivist perspective.  
Reading & Writing Quarterly, 16, 5-22. doi: 10.1080/105735600278042 
 
Maria, K., & MacGinitie,  W. (1987). Learning from texts that refute the reader’s prior  
knowledge. Reading Research and Instruction, 26, 222-238. doi: 10.1080/ 
19388078709557912 
 
Mason, L. (2001). Responses to anomalous data on controversial topics and theory  
change. Learning and Instruction, 11, 453-483. doi: 10.1016/S0959-
4752(00)00042-6 
 
Mason, L., & Boscolo, P. (2004). Role of epistemological understanding and interest in  
interpreting a controversy and in topic-specific belief change. Contemporary 
Educational Psychology, 29, 103-128. doi: 10.1016/j.cedpsych.2004.01.001 
 
Mason, L., Gava, M., & Boldrin, A. (2008). On warm conceptual change: The interplay 
 of text, epistemological beliefs, and topic interest. Journal of Educational 
 Psychology, 100, 291-309. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.100.2.291 
 
Matson, G., & Cline, T. (2012). The impact of specific language impairment on  
performance in science and suggested implications for pedagogy. Child Language 
Teaching and Therapy, 28, 25-37. doi: 10.1177/0265659011414276 
 
 
70 
 
       
 
MetaMetrics. (2012). Lexile-to-Grade Correspondence. Retrieved from Lexile® website: 
http://www.lexile.com/about-lexile/grade-equivalent/grade-equivalent-chart/ 
 
Mikkilä-Erdmann, M. (2001). Improving conceptual change concerning photosynthesis  
through text design. Learning and Instruction, 11, 241-257. doi: 10.1016./S0959-
4752(00)00041-4 
 
Moje, E. B. (2008a). Foregrounding the disciplines in secondary literacy teaching and  
 learning: A call for change. Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy, 52, 96-107. 
 Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20111747 
 
Moje, E. B. (2008b). Responsive literacy teaching in secondary school content areas. In  
 M.W. Conley, J. R. Freidhoff, M. B. Sherry, & S. F. Tuckey (Eds.), Meeting the 
 challenge of adolescent literacy: Research we have, research we need (pp. 58-
 87). New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Moje, E. B., & Speyer, J. (2008). The reality of challenging texts in high school science  
 and social studies: How teachers can mediate comprehension. In K. A. Hinchman 
 & H. K. Sheridan-Thomas (Eds.), Best practices in adolescent literacy instruction 
 (pp. 185-211). New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
National Center for Education Statistics. (2011a). The nation’s report card: Reading  
2011 (NCES 2012-457). Retrieved from U.S. Department of Education, Institute 
of Education Sciences website: http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/ 
main2011/ 2012457.pdf 
 
National Center for Education Statistics. (2011b). The nation’s report card: Science 2009  
 (NCES 2011-451). Retrieved from U.S. Department of Education, Institute of 
 Education Sciences website: http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid= 
 2011451 
 
National Center for Education Statistics. (2012). The nation’s report card: Science 2011  
 (NCES 2012-465). Retrieved from U.S. Department of Education, Institute of 
 Education Sciences website: http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2011/ 
2012465.pdf 
 
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. (2007). North Carolina end-of-grade  
test of science: Grade 8. Retrieved from Department of Public Instruction, 
Accountability Services Division website: http://www.ncpublicschools.org/ 
docs/accountability/testing/eog/science/grade8sciencereleaseditems.pdf 
 
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. (2008). Achievement level ranges for  
the North Carolina end-of-grade test: Science at grades 5 and 8. Retrieved from 
Department of Public Instruction, Accountability Services Division website: 
71 
 
       
 
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/accountability/testing/achievelevels/eogread
ingachievelevels.pdf 
 
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. (2011). Understanding the individual  
student report for the North Carolina end-of-grade science test: Grades 5 and 8. 
Retrieved from Department of Public Instruction, Accountability Services 
Division website: http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/accountability/uisrs/ 
1011eogsciuisr.pdf 
 
O’Reilly, T., & McNamara, D. S. (2007). The impact of science knowledge, reading skill, 
 and reading strategy knowledge on more traditional “high-stakes” measures of 
 high school students’ science achievement. American Educational Research 
 Journal, 44, 161-196. doi:10.3102/0002831206298171 
 
Pearson, P. D., Moje, E. B., & Greenleaf, C. (2010). Literacy and science: Each in the  
 service of the other. Science, 328, 459-463. doi: 10.1126/science.1182595 
 
Pintrich, P. R., & De Groot, E. V. (1990). Motivational and self-regulated learning 
 components of classroom academic performance. Journal of Educational 
 Psychology, 82, 33-40. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.82.1.33 
 
Pintrich, P. R., Marx, R. W., & Boyle, R. B. (1993). Beyond cold conceptual change: The  
 role of motivational beliefs and classroom contextual factors in the process of 
 conceptual change. Review of Educational Research, 63, 167-199. doi: 
 10.3102/00346543063002167 
 
Posner, G. J., Strike, K. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accomodation of a  
scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 
66, 211-227. doi: 10.1002/sce.3730660207  
 
Powers, D., & Beaver, J. B. (2010). Astronomy: Our solar system and beyond.  
Greensboro, NC: Mark Twain/Carson-Dellosa Publishing Company, Inc. 
 
Qian, G., & Alvermann, D. (1995). Role of epistemological beliefs and learned 
 helplessness in secondary school students’ learning science concepts from text. 
 Journal of Educational Psychology, 87, 282-292. doi: 10.1037/0022- 
0663.87.2.282 
 
Qian, G., & Alvermann, D. E. (2000). Relationship between epistemological beliefs and  
conceptual change learning. Reading & Writing Quarterly, 16, 59-74. doi: 
10.1080/105735600278060  
 
72 
 
       
 
Renninger, K. A., Ewen, L., & Lasher, A. K. (2002). Individual interest as context in 
 expository text and mathematical word problems. Learning and Instruction, 12, 
 467-491. doi: 10.1016/S0959-4752(01)00012-3 
 
Ridgeway, V. G., & Dunston, P. J. (2000). Content determines process: Seeing the  
familiar in new ways. Reading & Writing Quarterly, 16, 119-138. doi:  
10.1080/105735600277999 
 
Schiefele, U. (1999). Interest and learning from text. Scientific Studies of Reading, 3, 
 257-279. doi: 10.1207/s1532799xssr0303_4 
 
Schommer, M., Calvert, C., Gariglietti, G., & Bajaj, A. (1997). The development of 
 epistemological beliefs among secondary students: A longitudinal study. Journal 
 of Educational Psychology, 89, 37-40. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.89.1.37 
 
Schwartz, M. S., Sadler, P. M., Sonnert, G., & Tai, R. H. (2009). Depth versus breadth:  
How content coverage in high school science courses relates to later success in 
college science coursework. Science Education, 93, 798-826. doi: 
10.1002/sce.20328 
 
Shanahan, C. (2004). Teaching science through literacy. In T. L. Jetton  & J. A. Dole 
 (Eds.), Adolescent literacy research and practice (pp. 75-93). New York: The 
 Guilford Press. 
 
Shanahan, C. (2009). Disciplinary comprehension. In S. E. Israel & G. G. Duffy (Eds.),  
 Handbook of research on reading comprehension (pp. 240-260). New York: 
 Routledge. 
 
Shanahan, C. (2012). Learning with text in science. In T. L. Jetton & C. Shanahan (Eds.),  
Adolescent literacy in the academic disciplines: General principles and practical 
strategies, (pp. 154-171). New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Shanahan, T., & Shanahan, C. (2008). Teaching disciplinary literacy to adolescents:  
 Rethinking content-area literacy. Harvard Educational Review, 78, 40-59. 
 Retrieved from http://her.hepg.org/content/w22rxj660t68/?v=editorial 
 
Sinatra, G. M. (2005). The “warming trend” in conceptual change research: The legacy of 
 Paul R. Pintrich. Educational Psychologist, 40, 107-115. doi: 10.1207/  
s15326985ep4002_5 
 
Smolkin, L. B., McTigue, E. M., & Donovan, C. A. (2008). Explanation and science text:  
 Overcoming the comprehension challenges in nonfiction text for elementary 
 students. In C. C. Block & S. R. Parris (Eds.), Comprehension instruction: 
73 
 
       
 
 Research-based best practices (2nd ed., pp.183-195). New York: The Guilford 
 Press. 
 
Swafford, J., & Bryan, J. K. (2000). Instructional strategies for promoting conceptual  
change: Supporting middle school students. Reading & Writing Quarterly, 16, 
139-161. doi: 10.1080/105735600278006 
 
Tippett, C. D. (2010). Refutation text in science education: A review of two decades of  
 research. International Journal of Science and Mathematics Education, 8, 951-
 970. doi:10.1007/s10763-010-9203-x 
 
Tobias, S. (1994). Interest, prior knowledge, and learning. Review of Educational 
 Research, 64, 37-54. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1170745 
 
Venville, G. J., & Treagust, D. F. (1998). Exploring conceptual change in genetics using 
 a multidimensional interpretive framework. Journal of Research in Science 
 Teaching, 35, 1031-1055. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1098-2736(199811)35:9<1031:: 
 AID-TEA5>3.0.CO;2-E 
 
Wang, T., & Andre, T. (1991). Conceptual change text versus traditional text and  
application questions versus no questions in learning about electricity. 
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 16, 103-116. doi: 10.1016/0361-
476X(91)90031-F 
 
Wilson, T. V. (2011). How magnets work. Retrieved from How Stuff Works website: 
http://science.howstuffworks.com/magnet1.htm 
 
Windschitl, M., & Andre, T. (1998). Using computer simulations to enhance conceptual 
 change: The roles of constructivist instruction and student epistemological beliefs. 
 Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 35, 145-160. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1098- 
2736(199802)35:2<145::AID-TEA5>3.0.CO;2-S 
 
74 
 
       
 
APPENDIX A 
 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Indicate, on a scale of 1 to 5, the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
1. All questions in science have only one right answer. 
2. Some ideas in science today are different than what scientists used to think. 
3. Scientists know pretty well everything about science; there is not much more to know. 
 
4. There are some questions that even scientists cannot answer. 
5. Once scientists have the result of an experiment, that becomes the only answer. 
6. New discoveries can change what scientists think is true. 
7. The most important part of doing science is arriving at the right answer. 
8. The ideas in science books sometimes change. 
9. Scientific knowledge is always true. 
10. Ideas in science sometimes change. 
11. Scientists always agree about what is true in science. 
12. Sometimes scientists change their minds about what is true in science. 
 
(adapted from Mason, Gava, & Boldrin, 2008)
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APPENDIX B 
 
SELF-EFFIACY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 the degree to which each statement describes you in regards 
to your science class. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Mostly not Somewhat Mostly Very 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
 
 
1. Compared with other students in my science class, I expect to do well. 
2. I’m certain I can understand the ideas taught in science. 
3. I expect to do very well in my science class. 
4. Compared with others in my science class, I think I’m a good student. 
5. I am sure I can do an excellent job on the problems and tasks assigned for my science 
class. 
 
6. I think I will receive a good grade in my science class. 
7. My study skills are excellent compared with others in my science class. 
8. Compared with other students in my science class, I think I know a great deal about the 
subject. 
 
9. I know that I will be able to learn the material for my science class. 
 
(adapted from Pintrich & De Groot, 1990) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
TOPIC INTEREST QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 the extent to which each statement describes you. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Mostly not Somewhat Mostly Very 
true of me true of me true of me true of me true of me 
  
 
1. I would be excited about studying TOPIC in science class. 
2. I think that there are many more relevant topics than TOPIC to learn about in science 
classes. 
 
3. I think it is important to know SOMETHING ABOUT THE TOPIC. 
4. If I came across a TV show that talked about TOPIC, I would be eager to understand it. 
 
5. I think that during science classes some time could be devoted to talking about TOPIC. 
 
6. I am not interested in knowing more scientific aspects of TOPIC. 
7. I think that TOPIC is a difficult but worthwhile topic of science. 
8. I would get involved in knowing SOMETHING ABOUT THE TOPIC. 
9. I am eager to know SOMETHING ABOUT THE TOPIC. 
10. Knowing how TOPIC is not important to me. 
(adapted from Mason et al., 2008)
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APPENDIX D 
 
KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENTS 
 
 
Seasonal Change (adapted from Broughton et al., 2010; Powers & Beaver, 2010) 
 
1. Explain why it is hotter in the summer than it is in the winter. 
 
2. Explain the causes for why the seasons change. 
 
3. This is a drawing of the earth in two positions of its orbit around the sun. Draw the 
earth’s axis when it is winter and when it is summer in the Northern Hemisphere. 
 
WINTER      SUMMER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Explain the impact of the earth’s axis on why the seasons change. 
 
5. Of the following choices, which looks most like the earth’s orbit around the sun? 
 
A. a   C.   
 
 
D.  
 
B.   
E.  
 
 
 
6. How often is the sun directly overhead at noon in your hometown? 
A. Every day.        
B. Only in the summer.      
C. Only for the week of the summer solstice. 
D. Only for one day each year. 
E. Never. 
 
 
earth earth 
 
. 
Sun 
 
Sun .
.  Sun  
 
.
Sun
 
. Sun 
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7. The main reason we have hot summers and cold winters is because: 
A. the earth’s distance from the sun changes.   
B. the sun is higher in the sky.     
C. the distance between the Northern Hemisphere and the sun changes. 
D. ocean currents carry warm water north. 
E. an increase in “greenhouse” gases. 
 
8. During July at the North Pole, the sun would: 
A. be overhead at noon.      
B. never set.        
C. be visible for 12 hours each day. 
D. set in the northwest. 
E. none of the above. 
 
9. Which date below has the most hours of daylight in your hometown? 
A. June 15        
B. July 15        
C. August 15 
D. September 15 
E. All dates are the same 
 
 
Object Motion (adapted from Alvermann & Hague, 1989; Hynd et al., 1994) 
 
1. Explain why an object thrown from the top of a building moves downward. 
 
2. Explain why an object in motion comes to a stop. 
 
3. Draw the path that the marble would take if you shot it off the table with your fingers. 
The X marks where you would be standing as you shot the marble off the farther end of 
the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 X 
 
4. Explain the reasoning behind the path you drew. 
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5. Of the following choices, select the path a cannonball shot off a cliff is most likely to 
take: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. The effect of gravity on an object’s forward motion: 
A. is delayed, causing it to continue forward before moving down.    
B. stops the forward motion, causing it to move down immediately.    
C. is immediate, causing it to curve down in a forward motion. 
D. is not strong enough to pull it down. 
E. depends on how fast the object moves. 
 
7. Supplies dropped from an airplane will fall to the ground: 
A. somewhere in front of the original drop point.   
B. somewhere behind the original drop point.     
C. exactly at the drop point. 
D. at a point that depends on how hard they were pushed out of the plane. 
E. at a point that cannot be predicted. 
 
8. A car slams on its brakes. The inertia of the car and the inertia of the passengers: 
A. are exactly the same, such that the car and its passengers stop at the same time.  
B. are separate, such that the passengers stop moving before the car stops. 
C. are separate, such that the passengers continue moving after the car stops. 
D. depend on the speed of the car. 
E. depend on the weight of the passengers. 
 
9. An example of an external force that acts to slow a bowling ball is: 
A. the weight of the ball.       
B. the speed of the ball.       
C. the force of the ball’s drop. 
D. the friction from the bowling lane. 
E. the distance to the bowling pins. 
 
 
 
A C D E B 
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Eclipses (adapted from Powers & Beaver, 2010) 
 
1. Explain why the moon looks different every day. 
 
2. Explain how an eclipse occurs. 
 
3. Below is a drawing of the sun. Draw the positions of the earth and moon during a solar 
eclipse. Make sure you label the earth and moon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Explain the reasoning behind the locations of the earth and moon in your drawing. 
 
5. The diagram below shows different locations of the moon (A-E).  
Write the letter of the full moon phase here: ________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Eclipses do not occur every time there is a new moon or a full moon because: 
A. the earth revolves around the sun.     
B. the orbits of the moon and the earth are not even with one another.    
C. the moon blocks the light from the sun. 
D. there is not a new moon or full moon every month. 
E. the sun, earth, and moon are perfectly aligned. 
 
7. A lunar eclipse is caused by: 
A. the moon’s shadow on the earth.   
B. the earth’s shadow on the moon.     
C. a new moon. 
D. a full moon. 
E. the sun’s rays hitting the moon. 
 
 
 
earth 
A 
B 
C 
E D 
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8. A solar eclipse takes place: 
A. once a month.   
B. twice a month. 
C. when the moon is in its new moon phase. 
D. when the moon is in its full moon phase. 
E. when the moon is in either its new moon or full moon phase. 
 
9. A solar eclipse is visible: 
A. to everyone on the earth.       
B. to everyone on the side of the earth facing the sun.     
C. to a small portion of people on the side of the earth facing the sun. 
D. to everyone on the side of the earth away from the sun. 
E. to an astronaut on the moon. 
 
 
Magnets (adapted from Beaver & Powers, 2010; Wilson, 2011) 
1. Explain how magnets attract one another. 
 
2. Explain one way to make a temporary magnet. 
 
3. Below are drawings of two metals divided into domains. Use arrows to indicate the 
direction each domain points in the unmagnetized metal and the magnetized metal.  
 
 UNMAGNETIZED         MAGNETIZED 
 
    
4. Explain the reasoning behind the arrows you drew in the two metals above. 
 
5. Select the drawing that depicts how magnets behave when brought toward each other. 
 
A.      D.  
 
 
 
B. d    E. 
 
 
 
C.   
 
 
N      S S      N S      N N      S 
N      S N      S N      N S      S 
N      S N      S 
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6. The alignment of magnetic domains causes: 
A. the strength of a magnet.  
B. the shape of a magnet.    
C. unlike poles to attract.     
D. like poles to attract. 
E. electrons to align. 
 
7. An electromagnet is different from a permanent magnet because it: 
A. is not made of iron.   
B. does not have poles.     
C. can be turned on and off. 
D. is caused by the movement of electrons. 
E. it is stronger. 
 
8. Maglev trains can float above the track because: 
A. it travels at high speeds.   
B. electromagnets in the track repel magnets on the train. 
C. it does not have wheels. 
D. permanent magnets power the train. 
E. the magnetic domains of the track point upward. 
 
9. Temporary magnets: 
A. do not have magnetic domains.       
B. can be created from electric current.     
C. are not as useful as permanent magnets. 
D. cannot repel other magnets. 
E. can be created from plastic.
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APPENDIX E 
 
SCIENCE TEXTS 
 
 
WHY THE SEASONS CHANGE  
(adapted from Broughton et al., 2010; Powers & Beaver, 2010) 
 
Many people believe that the changing seasons are the result of the earth being closer to 
the sun during the summer months and farther away from the sun during the winter 
months. They think this because typically the closer you are to a heat source, such as a 
hot stove, the hotter it is. Seasons, however, do not change because the distance between 
the earth and the sun changes. In fact, the earth is slightly closer to the sun in winter and 
farther away from the sun in summer. We owe our seasons – spring, summer, fall, and 
winter – to the revolution of the earth around the sun and the tilt of the earth’s axis. 
 
The earth makes a complete revolution around the sun every 365 and ¼ days. This path is 
referred to as earth’s orbit around the sun. The earth also rotates, or spins, around its axis 
once every day. The axis is an imaginary line that runs from the North Pole to the South 
Pole through the center of the earth. There is a 23.5-degree tilt of the earth on its axis. 
These two features of the earth cause seasonal change. 
 
When the Northern Hemisphere is tilted toward the sun, it receives the sun’s rays at a 
more direct angle than it does during the other times of the year. This is the time of year 
that the Northern Hemisphere has summer. Not only are the sun’s rays more direct, but 
the days are longer in the summer because the sun rises earlier in the morning and sets 
later in the evening. The first day of summer, which occurs halfway through the year, 
receives the most sunlight. While it is summer in the Northern Hemisphere, the Southern 
Hemisphere is experiencing winter.  
 
The axis always points in the same direction as the earth revolves around the sun. On the 
opposite side of its orbit, a different portion of the earth receives the sun’s direct rays. 
The Northern Hemisphere experiences winter when the earth tilts away from the sun. The 
day with the least amount of sunlight occurs in December. The other two seasons occur 
between the extremes of winter and summer. As the earth continues on its orbit, the 
Northern Hemisphere begins to get closer to the sun. For us, spring begins in March. 
After summer, as the Northern Hemisphere begins to tilt away from the sun, we 
experience fall.  
 
401 words; Lexile = 1020L; Fog index = 8.58 
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NEWTON’S THEORY OF MOTION  
(adapted from Hynd et al., 1994) 
 
Before the time of Sir Isaac Newton, people believed that an object in motion moved 
because of a force inside the object. After all, they could not see any outside cause for an 
object to keep moving or stop. A force inside the object must have been the cause of 
motion, and as it weakened, the object would slowly come to a stop. People still think 
this today, even though science has disproved it. 
 
Newton’s theory of motion states that every object in motion will stay in motion until 
acted upon by an outside force. It is incorrect to think that a rolling object stops or a 
projectile (an object moving through the air) falls because of the loss of internal force. 
Newton explained that a moving object comes to a stop or begins to fall because external 
(or outside) forces act to change the speed or direction of the object’s motion. A ball 
rolling across the floor, for example, is slowed by friction, a force that acts in the 
opposite direction of the ball’s motion. An object that is carried is in motion, even though 
it appears to be at rest compared to the person carrying it. That is why when a vehicle 
comes to a stop, the objects inside the car continue in their forward motion. All objects 
have inertia, which keeps them moving until something stops them. 
 
To get a sense of Newton’s theory of motion, imagine the following scene. A person is 
holding a stone at shoulder height while walking forward at a fast pace. What will happen 
when the person drops the stone? What kind of path will the stone follow as it falls? 
Many people think that the stone will fall straight down, striking the ground directly 
under the point where it was dropped. A few people even believe that the falling stone 
will travel backward and land behind the point where it was dropped. The stone really 
moves forward as it falls, landing a few feet ahead of the point where it was dropped. 
When the stone is dropped, it keeps moving forward at the same speed as the walking 
person because no outside force acted to change its forward direction. In the same way, a 
projectile fired horizontally will move not only forward but also downward because of 
the constant force of gravity. In fact, the object will begin to move downward in a curved 
path from the moment it is fired. 
 
410 words; Lexile = 1130L; Fog index = 9.18 
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ECLIPSES  
(adapted from Powers & Beaver, 2010) 
 
An eclipse occurs when one object in space moves into the shadow of another object in 
space and is either partially or totally hidden by it. If you walk into the shadow cast by a 
tree, then you have been eclipsed by that tree. The tree has blocked the sunlight that 
would have reached you and reflected off your body. The tree has come between you and 
the sun. 
 
In order to understand how eclipses occur, you first have to understand a little bit about 
the phases of the moon. You may have noticed that the moon’s appearance changes 
slightly every day. This is because the moon rotates around the earth about every 27 days. 
When the moon is between the sun and the earth, we cannot see it. This is the new moon 
phase. As the moon rotates around the earth, we are able to see more and more of it 
illuminated by the sun. At the opposite side of the earth, when the earth is between the 
moon and the sun, we can see the entire moon. This is the full moon phase.  
 
Sometimes the orbits of the earth and moon perfectly align to block the sunlight. When 
the earth, moon, and sun are perfectly aligned, an eclipse of either the sun or the moon 
may occur. A solar eclipse occurs when the moon blocks light from the sun resulting in 
the total or partial disappearance of the sun as seen from the earth. A solar eclipse is 
possible when the moon is in the new moon phase. A lunar eclipse occurs when the earth 
blocks the sun’s light from reaching the moon. A lunar eclipse is possible during a full 
moon phase.  
 
Eclipses do not occur every time there is a new or full moon. Remember, an eclipse can 
only happen if the earth’s orbit around the sun and the moon’s orbit around the earth 
intersect during a new moon or full moon phase. This does not happen every month 
because the paths of those two orbits are about six degrees different. The three celestial 
bodies do not always line up in a way that the earth or moon blocks part or all of the 
sun’s light. Fortunately, scientists understand enough about the motion of the sun, earth, 
and moon to be able to predict the dates and times of solar and lunar eclipses. 
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MAGNETS  
(adapted from Beaver & Powers, 2010; Wilson, 2011) 
 
You may have used magnets many times, perhaps to put a picture on your refrigerator, 
but have you ever given much thought to how they work? Magnets attract certain metals, 
such as iron and nickel, and attract or repel other magnets. Magnets come in many sizes, 
shapes, and strengths. No matter what the shape is, magnets have two poles: a north pole 
and a south pole. If you have held two magnets, you have felt the force that exists around 
them. This invisible force is called the magnetic field, and it is strongest near the poles. 
The phrase, “opposites attract” likely comes from our understanding of magnets since 
unlike poles attract and like poles repel.  
 
What causes this attraction? All objects are made of microscopic atoms. Each atom has 
three parts: protons and neutrons in the nucleus and electrons that circle the nucleus. 
When the electrons of several atoms align, a magnetic domain is created. Each domain is 
essentially a tiny magnet with a north and south pole, and the domains combine to create 
one strong magnet. In a permanent magnet, like iron, the north poles of each domain 
always point in the same direction. This alignment explains why opposite poles attract. It 
also explains why a magnet broken into two pieces results in two smaller magnets, each 
with a north and south pole. 
 
Other magnets are temporary magnets. An unmagnetized metal, such as a nail, is 
comprised of domains, but the north poles point in random directions. A temporary 
magnet can be made by rubbing a permanent magnet against a piece of unmagnetized 
metal a few times in one direction. This causes the domains to align. The electrons of 
some materials, such as wood and plastic, will never align.  
 
Electricity, like magnetism, is caused by the movement of electrons. Electricity is created 
as electrons move from one atom to another. A temporary magnet known as an 
electromagnet is produced by this flow. Electromagnets can be made by wrapping wire 
around a nail and then attaching the ends of the wire to a battery. When an electric 
current passes through the coiled wire, the domains in the nail line up, creating a 
magnetic field. Very large electromagnets are being used in Germany and Japan to lift 
and drive high-speed trains called maglev trains. These trains do not have wheels. 
Instead, they use magnetic levitation to float above special rails.  
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